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Abstract 
Water is life. Its availability and quality directly relates to what is possible in agriculture as well as 
human health. In Southern Africa, water issues have become an important political agenda as a result 
of the droughts that the region has been experiencing. The Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC), in its water protocol advises its member states to set up river basin organisations to manage 
transboundary rivers in Southern Africa. The aim is to encourage the sustainable use of international 
rivers.  
 
Sharing international rivers has proven to be a very difficult issue as shown by the voting patterns on 
the UN Convention on the Law of Non Navigational Uses of Transboundary Rivers and the 
subsequent failure of entry into force of this convention. While strategic interests on the global levels 
manifest themselves in voting patterns in forums like the UN Assembly, the situation is trickier at the 
regional level. These strategic interests are ever present as a result of states’ need for recognition of 
their sovereignty and the inability of states to accept any hierarchical enforcement. 
 
This study investigates the impact of these interests at the basin level on the structure of cooperation. 
With the use of a case study, namely the Okavango River Basin Commission, and guided by regime 
theory, the study looks at the process of regime formation and maintenance in the basin. It concludes 
that states use cooperative arrangements (international water cooperation regimes) as tools for the 
strategic protection of their sovereignty. 
. 
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Opsomming 
Water is lewe. Die beskikbaarheid en kwaliteit het direk te betrekking op wat moontlik toeneemed is 
in landbou so wel as menslike gesondheid. Water as ŉ noodsaaklike bron in suider-Afrika word meer 
en meer beskou as ŉ belangrike kwessie op die politieke agenda as gevolg van droogte wat in die 
streek ondervind word. ŉ Hoë vlak van belangrikheid  word aan die bestuur van water binne die streek 
geheg. Die SAOG (Die Suider – Afrikaanse Ontwikkelings gemeenskap), het in sy water protokol aan 
sy lid state beveel om rivier kom organisasies te stig om beheer uit te oefen oor riviere in Suider-
Afrika wat oor grense heen vloei. Die doel is om lidstate aan te moedig om die volhoubare gebruik 
van internasionale riviere te bevorder . 
 
Die vedeling van internasionale riviere is ‘n komplekse kwessie soos wat VN stempatrone aandui ten 
opsigte van die Wet op die Verbod teen Navigasie op Oorgrensende Riviere en die daaropvolgende 
versuim van die inwerkingtreding van die Konvensie aandui. As gevolg van state se behoefte vir 
erkenning van hul soewereiniteit en hul strategiese belange bly die deel van rivierkomme ‘n moeilike 
internasionale probleem. 
 
Hierdie studie ondersoek die impak van die bogenoemde belange op die kom vlak op die struktuur van 
samewerking. Met die gebruik van ŉ gevallestudie, naamlik die Okovango Rivier Kom Kommissie, en 
aan die hand van regime teorie, ondersoek die studie die proses van regime formasie asook die 
problematiek rondom die instandhouding van die Komissie. Die gevolgtrekking is dat state 
koöperatiewe reëlings (internasionale water samewerking regimes) as instrumente vir die beskerming 
van hul strategiese soewereiniteit en eie belange gebruik. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction and Background to the Study 
Water is life. Trivial as this statement may sound, it emphasises the importance of water in 
human societies and in sustaining human life itself. For the majority of the world’s poor who have 
to depend on agriculture, a good supply of water, either through irrigation or rainfall, makes a 
difference between life and death. With adequate water, one is able to farm, produce food and use 
the surplus for sale. Produce from agriculture helps to pay for education, health care and other 
essential services. Adequate quality water means the difference between children or indeed the 
general population catching waterborne diseases or leading a healthy life and reducing health 
expenditures. In this way, water becomes inextricably linked to poverty (Kulindwa and Lein, 
2008). The inability to harness water properly, compounded by drought and bad government 
policies, have led to huge food security problems, affecting the livelihoods of hundreds of millions 
of people in the past. The Ethiopian famine of 1985 comes to mind.  
On the global level, a world water crisis is said to be the largest public health concern with 
nearly 20% of the world population without access to safe drinking water. This lack of access is 
directly linked to the deaths of 4 500 children per day (Ethos Water, 2009). At this level as well, 
demographics are the most important source of pressure on water. A growth in the world 
population of up to 80 million people a year means an annual increase of fresh water demand of 
up to 64 billion cubic meters (UN World Water Development Report 3, 2009). A world fresh 
water crisis is closely linked to a world food crisis with this link becoming more important in the 
context of climate change (Environmental News Service, 2008). 
Southern Africa has experienced its share of food security problems triggered by droughts 
from around the early 1980s to the 1990s and the first few years of the 21st century. These food 
security emergencies saw hundreds of thousands of people relying on food aid. This was a failure 
of governments to feed their own people. This is the same time that Africa witnessed the 
appearance and upsurge of HIV and AIDS on the continent. This meant that the problem of water 
scarcity and HIV and AIDS further reduced the capabilities of the poor households to effectively 
get out of poverty. Tackling poverty became increasingly complicated.  
The events described above roughly coincided with the second wave of democratisation on 
the African continent. African leaders began to include water as a political agenda, especially in 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Turton, 2005:9). This saw fresh water 
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resources taking a general movement like other natural resources, into the discourse of 
securitisation. Securitisation is the positioning of resources as existential threats such that they 
gain salience within particular political settings (Turton, 2003). Notwithstanding the above 
analysis, the southern part of the SADC region comprising South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, 
Lesotho, and Swaziland is much drier compared to the northern part.  For this part of the region, 
and indeed a wider world experiencing water shortages, the resulting shift into the security 
discourse has since changed the way national security threats are assessed. Some of the issues, for 
example, that have become matters of national security include issues ranging from food to the 
environment. It is within this background that the management of transboundary rivers has gained 
salience over the past decades. High ranking officials like the former UN Secretary General, 
Boutros Boutros Gali, have predicted a shift from the “conventional” resources connected to 
conflict to what they have called “water wars” (Wolf, quoted in Alam, 2002:347). The water wars 
thesis states that water scarcity leads to conflict; however, this has been refuted by scholars like 
Turton (2000), Ashton (2000) and Alam (2002) arguing that water tends to result in cooperation 
rather than conflict. In the context of SADC, this has also largely been the case as cooperation is 
being pursued as a larger objective of the grouping. To this extent, SADC could be viewed as a 
security community within the context of the democratic peace theory, which will be reviewed 
later in chapter two. 
International cooperation is an important part of the current liberal world order. In a fast 
globalizing world, very few things would be possible without international cooperation. For 
example, travel and communication would be impossible without international cooperation. States 
need to agree on cooperation mechanisms in order to have all these systems operating smoothly. 
These systems have been called regimes in International Relations. Most of these regimes bring 
benefits such that they appear overwhelmingly positive (Little, 2008:298). This definitely applies 
to the world postal regime and air travel regime. As a result of the successes registered in areas 
such as telecommunications and travel, regime formation to manage international cooperation has 
become fashionable. It has therefore been extended to several other areas including the 
environment and its natural resources. An example of a regime formed to manage the environment 
is the Kyoto protocol designed to reduce green house gases in order to tackle climate change. 
Spurred by the importance of water to national economic development and poverty alleviation, 
international rivers are increasingly being managed using regimes. The Mekong and Indus Rivers 
are examples in point. Transboundary rivers fall within the framework of the 1997 UN 
Convention on the Law of Non Navigational Uses of International Water Courses (United 
Nations, 1997). At the regional level, SADC has actively promoted the establishment of River 
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Basin Organisations (RBOs) as a way of managing the utilisation of transboundary rivers. This 
falls within the 1995 SADC Water protocol revised in 2000 to include provisions of the 1997 UN 
convention cited above. For detailed information about global, continental and regional water 
instruments, refer to appendix C on page 64. 
The purpose of this study is to understand how strategic considerations like sovereignty 
affect the structure of institutions emanating from cooperation regimes. It will, specifically, focus 
on water cooperation. To this end, the Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM) will be 
used as a case study. The Okavango River flows through three countries, namely Angola, Namibia 
and Botswana. In 1994, the three countries established the permanent Okavango River Basin 
Commission (OKACOM). The objective of the Commission was to act as a technical advisor to 
the three governments with regard to conservation, development, and utilization of water 
resources found in the Okavango basin (de Wet et al., 2008:45). 
1.2  Problem Statement 
Transboundary rivers, as is apparent from the nomenclature, are rivers that have crossed 
one or more international boundaries. Their management therefore requires collaboration between 
two or more countries. The reality is that the world is and will remain organised politically into 
sovereign territorial states for the foreseeable future, while at the same time the need for 
interconnectedness is ever more important in order to facilitate economic and social integration 
(Lawrence, 1996: xiv). According to Ruggie (1998:47) “the international state system, in 
principle, has been a decentralized one: states are subject to no external earthly authority”. States 
therefore are under no obligation to cooperate, however, in certain instances, they choose to do so. 
An example of an economic integration project in transboundary rivers is the co-management of 
river resources exemplified by an organization like the Okavango River Basin Commission. The 
political reality however poses a problem as it entails that sovereignty has to be maintained at all 
times whereas the problem needing cooperation requires that a little of this sovereignty be given 
away to a collective decision making body. 
Inevitably, cooperation involves compromise (Nel et al., 2001). In any kind of agreement - 
with the exception of a situation where parties to the agreement agree on everything - sacrifices 
have to be made in order for a consensus to be reached. As mentioned above, many studies have 
shown that rather than bringing conflict, international water cooperation breeds peace (Turton, 
2002; Alam, 2002). How do states’ interests (including sovereignty concerns) affect the prospects 
for cooperation in relation to the Okavango River Basin Commission? 
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1.3  Rationale 
The establishment of regimes like the Okavango River Basin Commission has been used 
by SADC as a basis for cooperation in transboundary rivers. The SADC Water Protocol urges all 
states to come up with such bodies to manage transboundary rivers. While so much has been 
written about transboundary cooperation in Southern Africa (see Turton and Ashton: 2002), an 
equal amount of effort has not been put into studying the nature of the regimes that emerge. This 
is an opportune time to take a step towards this direction given claims of climate change and its 
adverse effects on the environment. As a result of this, water issues are going to be critical in the 
near future. Regimes formulated to deal with these issues have to be ready to tackle these issues if 
and when they do arise. This study therefore aims to contribute to a better understanding of the 
regimes that are emerging and comprehend their evolution. 
Turton et al. (2003) suggest that the transboundary water configuration in Southern Africa 
indicates the presence of a hydropolitical complex where economically advanced and relatively 
dry countries are sharing international rivers with less developed countries. This theory is based 
on Buzan’s theory of a security complex (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998 and Schulz, 1995 cited 
in Turton et al., 2003). This discussion will be covered in more detail in chapter two under a 
section 2.4. If a hydropolitical complex does exist, this has important implications for institutions 
that emerge. 
Lastly, this study is important as millions of people depend on international rivers. In the 
Okavango delta, thousands of households in Ngamiland District of Botswana and thousands others 
from the Namibian side rely on the Okavango River for agricultural production and other 
livelihoods. What happens on the international level on the use of these rivers will affect human 
security in the region. 
1.4  Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of the study is to understand how compromises and considerations 
about sovereignty and access to water affect cooperation in the emerging transboundary water 
management architecture in Southern Africa. In other words, how is the regime, which results out 
of the cooperation of two or more international governmental parties, affected by the compromises 
and sovereign considerations? The study will, therefore, explore how strategic considerations 
relating to national interest and sovereignty have impacted on cooperation in the Okavango River 
Basin. 
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1.5  Research Hypothesis 
The study has two working hypotheses. The first is that states use regimes to enhance 
their positions vis-à-vis other states. The second hypothesis advanced is that states rationally 
design international agreements to protect themselves in addition to advancing their interests. 
These hypotheses come from the understanding that states play an important role in the formation 
of regimes. Once these regimes have been established and are operational like the different water 
commissions, including the case of the Okavango, they become legitimate international actors on 
their own accord. States party to the regime are, by virtue of being signatories, mandated to 
comply with the issues that come out of the regime or risk defection. Therefore, to protect 
themselves from unforeseeable circumstances and to protect their own sovereignty, countries will 
deliberately build in “weaknesses” or “loopholes” at the design stage of the regime. 
1.6  Methodology 
The study will utilize a qualitative methodology specifically using a case study approach. 
The case chosen is the Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM). The OKACOM is one of 
the many river basin organizations that have emerged with the backing of SADC. The case study 
will involve a detailed analysis of the activities of the three cooperating states focusing on the 
process of regime formation. Using regime theory, the processes and workings of the resulting 
regime will be critically appraised.  This appraisal will intend to identify design weaknesses and 
loopholes that can confirm or reject the hypothesis raised in this study. 
Qualitative methodology has three important tenets - it aims to describe, understand and 
provide explanations to observed behaviour or changes (Tellis, 1997). The case study approach is 
useful for this undertaking as it fulfils all the three tenets of qualitative research. Several critiques 
of the case study approach have been advanced. First, it has been criticised for its incapability to 
reach generalised conclusions, hence lack of rigor (Levine, 1996:352). In response to this 
criticism, proponents of the methodology argue that theoretical generalisations, rather than 
population generalisations, are intended in case study research (Tellis, 1997), and that these 
theoretical generalisations are possible. Secondly a critique of the methodology as used in this 
study would be that a comparative study between two existing institutional forms would have 
yielded more insights. While this may be true, there does not exist a pure institutional form or an 
ideal type except in theoretical construction. In addition to this, these other institutional forms 
might be plagued by the same institutional design problems hypothesized here. This means that 
they may not be able to provide any useful information for the study. 
 
 
6
1.7  Limitations of the Study 
The study has three limitations. The first relates to the generalisability of the case study. 
While important lessons can be learned from studying cooperation in the Okavango River Basin, 
the configuration of relationships among the three case study countries is a unique one affected by 
among other factors the history as well as geopolitical realities in which these countries find 
themselves. No two river basin organisations can have identical relational configuration. While 
this a limitation on the case study selected, it is not a limitation per se on the study results as the 
main objective is to make general theoretical conclusions as argued by Tellis (1997). The second 
limitation relates to the theoretical framework choice i.e. regime theory. Regimes are generally 
agreements made between governments. This makes the discussion in the thesis state centric. 
Notwithstanding this, the influence of non state actors will to a limited extent be discussed. Lastly, 
resources available for conducting this study are a third limitation. The design of the study 
reflected the resources available. In a better resourced situation, a more elaborate design would 
have benefited the study leading to a richer and more detailed understanding of problem.  
1.8  Outline of Chapters 
The study consists of four chapters. The second chapter begins with a theoretical 
discussion on cooperation. After the discussion of the theoretical perspectives, the chapter will 
also review the literature available, with the aim of positioning this study in a wider discussion on 
international water cooperation and the impact of politics on international water regimes. 
Chapter three will be a discussion of the case study. The case study will be a detailed 
review of the process of the development of a water management regime in the Okavango River 
Basin. This chapter will look at the actors, the factors and main issues involved. After this 
discussion, chapter four will conclude the study with some lessons learned and suggestions for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Chapter one has introduced the subject under discussion - regime formation as a vehicle of 
cooperation. This chapter will review the relevant literature on the subject. The chapter will start 
by reviewing the theory dealing with international cooperation. Regime theory is the guiding 
theoretical framework for the study. Regimes in some cases, especially the case selected for this 
study, have resulted in the formation of international organizations. In order to properly get 
acquainted with the functionality of international organisations, this chapter will also review work 
on multilateralism before going on to review literature specifically dealing with institutional 
formation processes. It will show the gap existing in literature as far as understanding state 
preferences for actions in cooperative arrangements is concerned. However, before we delve into 
that, a discussion of regime theory is in order. 
2.2  Cooperation in the International System and Regime 
Theory 
 
2.2.1 Cooperation in the International System 
The problem of cooperation in the international system has been the subject of much 
debate, mainly but not exclusively, in two dominant traditions in International Relations. These 
traditions are Realism and Liberalism. Specifically, this thesis will discuss the debate between 
neorealism and Liberalism. Those with a neorealist persuasion have made four assumptions about 
the state. The first assumption is that the state exists in a condition of anarchy. It is anarchic as 
there is no overarching world government to police the activities of individual states as opposed to 
the situation within the nation states where the state apparatus has the monopoly over the use of 
violence (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008:92). Anarchy is used in this sense as an ordering principle as 
opposed to a chaotic and conflictual situation (Mearsheimer, 1995:10). The monopoly that states 
have, constrains the activities of individuals within the state, whereas on the international level, 
there are no such controls. The second assumption is that states have the capacity to wage war and 
they accumulate military hardware, software and prowess to maintain this capacity.  Thirdly, since 
competition characterizes this anarchic configuration, states cannot easily trust other states 
(Mearsheimer, 1995:10). For a neorealist, therefore, survival in such a situation is all about self 
interest and cut-throat competition. Any chance for one state to annihilate another state will be 
taken. Survival as motivation is the fourth assumption that neorealists make. When it comes to 
cooperation, neorealists contend that, while it is possible for states to cooperate, it is an exception 
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rather than the rule. States will cooperate only if two conditions will be satisfied. First, that they 
will benefit from cooperation relative to others, and secondly that there is no cheating 
(Mearsheimer, 1995:12). However, because states do not trust each other, cooperation is 
extremely difficult to achieve.  
On the other side of the debate, liberalists are much more optimistic about the outcome of 
the interaction between states. Liberalism has been built on the foundation of individual liberty 
and equality, which are the determinants of peace (Dunne, 2008:111). While liberalists accept the 
need and importance of the state, they however say that states should not interfere in the activities 
of individuals that live within them. From this logic comes economic liberalism and democracy as 
a form of governance. Within the security realm, the democratic peace theory has been the most 
prominent. This theory originates from Kant’s perpetual peace theory written in 17951 (Kant, 
1795). The theory has been and is still being debated in academic circles. Ostrowoski (2002) 
Rosato, (2003) and Zinnes (2004) are some of the recent contributors to the debate. In its basic 
representation, the democratic peace theory contends that democracies do not go to war with each 
other because of factors that can be either classified as normative or institutional (some use 
structural instead of institutional) (Zinnes, 2004:431 and Rosato, 2003:586-587). These norms and 
institutions are a distinctive feature of democracies and they act as constraints to conflict as they 
have conflict resolution mechanisms inherent in them. 
Liberalists view peace and cooperation among states as the norm and object to war as an 
anomaly in society. They contend that war can be remedied by commerce and collective security 
(Dunne, 2008:111). Earlier economic liberalists have argued that in the act of engagement in trade 
with other individuals and states, a common interest area is established around trade, which in turn 
promotes peace and cooperation. This is so because if the states were to engage in war, both 
would lose economically.2 In reaction to this and in a bid to advance our understanding of 
cooperation between states, Keohane (1989), a neoliberal institutionalist3, argues that  
an open international economic environment, characterized by opportunities for mutually 
rewarding exchange under orderly sets of rules provides incentives for peaceful behaviour, 
but not that it necessitates and ensures such behaviour. That is cooperation must be 
distinguished from harmony. Cooperation is not automatic, but requires planning and 
negotiation.  
                                                 
1 It is important to remember that Kant discusses a “republic”, which we equate to prevailing “liberal democracies” 
(see Adem, 2007 online at: 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/8/0/2/9/pages180293/p180293-1.php) 
2 Keohane (1989) argues that this is a naïve conception. Sometimes referred to as the “harmony of interests” this 
formation has been well criticized by E.H. Carr – Keohane (1989:11). 
3 Keohane does not seem to accept the label of “neoliberal” but readily accepts “neoliberal institutionalist” (Keohane, 
1989:16 – note #1). Mearsheimer, however, refers to him as a ‘liberal institutionalist”. 
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Keohane’s argument sets him apart from the classical liberal thinkers. He neither accepts the 
simplistic formulation of cooperation as conceived by classical liberal thinkers, nor does he reject 
the fact that cooperation is possible. He asserts that it is not automatic. Neorealists agree too that 
cooperation is not automatic. The theoretical formulation that best represents this convergence is 
regime theory (Little, 2008:298).  
 
2.2.2 Regime Theory 
The basic argument is that international regimes help facilitate cooperation in the 
international system. The common assumptions accepted by both according to Little (2008:98) 
are: 
a) States operate in an anarchic international system 
b) States are rational and unitary actors 
c) States are the units responsible for establishing regimes 
d) Regimes are established on the basis of cooperation in the international system 
e) Regimes promote international order. 
According to Keohane (1989:7), “[l]ike neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists seek to 
explain behavioural regularities by examining the nature of the decentralized international 
system”. Both neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists believe that there are parts of the 
international system that cannot be completely understood as a result, they work within what is 
known while employing assumptions for what is not known. As such “[n]either perspective is 
committed to the naïve notion that reality can be objectively known” (Keohane, 1989:8). 
Secondly, the centrality of the state has been one of the contentious assumptions in other 
formulations. However, in this particular theoretical endeavour, the state’s position has been 
accepted by both neorealist and neoliberal institutionalists. Keohane and Nye (1972) agree that 
“states have been and remain the most important actors in world affairs” (cited in Keohane, 
1989:1). In a change of conviction, Keohane (1989:8) confesses that subsequent research 
persuaded him that non-state actors continue to be subordinate to states. Thirdly, neoliberal 
institutionalists are in agreement with neorealists that in understanding the structure of the 
international system, we gain knowledge of “a small number of big and important things…to the 
extent that dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behaviour and the outcomes 
of their behaviour becomes predictable” (Waltz, 1979 cited in Keohane, 1989:8). However, due to 
the fact that international political reality can only be partially understood (Keohane, 1989:8), the 
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predictability referred to by Waltz above is not perfect predictability. This becomes even more 
complicated in the African situation considering that most of the theorising has been dominated by 
western scholars and state complexes such that in circumstances where the African state has been 
labelled as ‘weak’ and ‘contested’, endeavours at studying patterns of action among states is ever 
more an elusive exercise to engage in.  
While neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists agree on these issues, there are some 
important differences as well. The neorealist definition of structure is found wanting by neoliberal 
institutionalists. As a result of the narrow and confining conception, neorealists can only explain 
changes that come as a result of shifts in relative state capabilities, which are thought of as 
economic resources and state productivity on the one hand and military strength on the other 
(Keohane, 1989:8). Indeed “[u]nless the positions of units change relative to one another, the 
neorealist cannot explain changes in their behaviour” (Keohane, 1989:8). What the neorealist 
forgets from the perspective of neoliberal institutionalists is that conventions are as important as 
the distribution of capabilities among states. Neoliberal institutionalists contend that complex 
interdependence characterizes the relationship between states (Keohane, 1989:9). This means 
therefore that even though state A may be powerful and well endowed in terms of productive 
capacity and military potential, its relationship to state B might not be determined by its military 
dominance alone, rather by the benefits it gets by associating cordially with state B. This, 
however, applies to relationships between democratic states (Keohane, 1989:9). The contention of 
neoliberal institutionalists about the neorealist conception is that  
because neorealists do not properly specify the nature of the international environment, 
their conclusions about self help, about reliance on unit level capabilities, and about 
sources of shift in patterns of interstate relationships are often wrong or at best misleading 
(Keohane, 1989:9) 
Secondly, neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists differ on the kinds of cooperation 
problems for which regimes are useful. Neorealists believe regimes are useful for coordination 
problems while neoliberal institutionalists consider regimes best suited for collaboration problems. 
Coordination problems, as will be seen below, can be simplified as a situation where there is 
plenty available for everyone such that the utilization of state A, does not impede the ability and 
amount/quantity that state B can utilize. Collaboration problems are those that state As’ utilization 
of a resource directly impacts what is available for state B. Taking an example from the case 
study, a coordination problem means that there is enough water in the Okavango River to satisfy 
the water needs of all states sharing it, whereas a collaboration problem means there is not enough 
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water such that use of the water by Namibia for example directly affects how much Botswana can 
use. 
The third area in which they differ is the distribution of goods resulting from regimes. 
Neorealists contend that regimes generate differential benefits for states. Thus, according to 
neorealists, “the fundamental aim of states in any relationship is to prevent others in achieving 
advances in their relative capabilities” (Grieco, 1988 cited in Keohane, 1989:10). Neoliberal 
institutionalists present the relationship between the US and Europe or Japan for at least 20 years 
after World War II as evidence that this is not always the case. This is the debate between absolute 
and relative gains (Keohane, 1989:10). Mearsheimer (1995) fervently disagrees with neoliberal 
institutionalists and puts forward that as long as neoliberal institutionalists have agreed to the 
assumptions of state centrism, rationalism and the nature of its existence, i.e. anarchy, the idea of 
relative gains has to be the basis for distributing benefits (Mearsheimer, 1995:19).  
Fourth, they differ on how regimes are formed and maintained with the neoliberal 
institutionalists arguing that regimes are promoted and maintained by a hegemony while 
neorealists would rather point at power as the central feature of regime formation and survival 
(Little, 2008:299). A close examination however will find that power and hegemony are closely 
associated concepts since hegemony usually has power attached to it. This power could be 
economic, military or appeal of the hegemonic states’ culture or social norms.  
Finally, they differ on the effect regimes have on world order. Neoliberal institutionalists 
say that regimes promote world order whereas the neo realists argue that the nature of world order 
depends on the underlying principles and norms of regimes, not the mere presence of regimes 
(Little, 2008:299). For example, based on Mearsheimer's (1995) objections to neoliberal 
institutionalists voiced above, i.e. between relative and absolute gains, he says that regimes exert 
very little impact for states to conform or cooperate in the international system. 
As indicated above, regime theory is a theoretical formulation that argues that cooperation 
is possible in a world where there is no overarching world government. Both the realist and liberal 
traditions have contributed to its development (Haas, 1983:23). Krasner (1983:2) defines a regime 
as “sets of implicit principles, norms and rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. He makes a distinction 
between principles and norms of regimes versus rules and decision making processes. Principles 
and norms are the foundations on which regimes are built, while on the other hand rules and 
decision making processes are mechanisms that allow for the observance of principles and norms. 
Sometimes regimes take the form of institutions and become international organizations. In other 
cases, they do not. Either way, international regimes embody principles of multilateralism, which, 
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in addition to reciprocity, also include non-discrimination and cost and benefit sharing (Nel et al., 
2001.10). 
Keohane (1989:4) defines international regimes as “institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by 
governments that pertain to a particular set of issues in international relations”. This definition is 
given within the wider understanding of institutions as “persistent and connected sets of rules 
(formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” 
(Keohane, 1989:3).  According to Keohane, international regimes are a subset of institutions, 
which could also be formal intergovernmental or cross-national nongovernmental organisations 
and conventions.  
Conventions are not only pervasive in world politics but also temporary and logically prior 
to regimes or international organisations. In the absence of conventions, it would be 
difficult for states to negotiate with one another or even to understand the meaning of each 
other’s actions. Indeed, international regimes depend on the existence of conventions that 
make such negotiations possible (Keohane, 1989:4). 
Keohane also points out that the process by which international regimes develop represents 
an increased institutionalization of conventions. International organisations on the other hand 
make the evolution of international regimes possible, as international regimes cannot adapt or 
transform themselves (Keohane, 1989:5). 
While Krasner (1983) differentiates between principles and norms on the one hand and 
rules and decision making procedures on the other, Keohane (1989) only discusses rules, which 
are persistent and connected. For Krasner, a regime change occurs when principles and norms 
change as they are the foundation on which regimes are built. For Keohane, however, these 
persistent rules define the character of a regime or institution, therefore, a change in these rules 
inevitably means a change in the character of a regime. Keohane’s ‘rules’ can therefore be equated 
to Krasner’s ‘principles and norms’ and it is the change in these that will result in regime 
evolution. International regimes sometimes evolve into international organizations, which 
according to Keohane (1989), are the media for regime evolution. 
If a regime has norms and rules that give it a distinct behaviour, or in Krasner’s 
terminology, principles and norms and decision making procedures, this makes it an active actor 
in international relations. It means therefore that states party to this regime, implicitly accept or 
allow themselves to be driven or bound by the regime in particular issues which form the 
agreement of the regime. 
In essence, the states party to these regimes willingly surrender their sovereignty on certain 
issues for the sake of cooperation underlined by a positive, and possibly sustainable gain in the 
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area of cooperation. As an example, states willingly decide to bring borders close to their capitals4 
and cities inside the conventional territorial borders in order to make air transport possible despite 
the risk of annihilation through terrorism. 
It is therefore plausible to argue that in any regime negotiation, the judgment is between 
the kind and qualitative amount of sovereignty that will be lost. I will refer to this as the costs, 
against the anticipated benefits resulting from such cooperation. Cost of Cooperation is 
conceptualized to mean not only the cost in form of economic terms, but also in circumstantial 
terms. Circumstantial terms are those conditions and facts that are associated with a particular 
cooperation issue. These costs could be strategic in importance or they could be intangible, for 
example reputational in nature. Theoretically therefore, where costs are too high, no cooperation is 
expected to exist. Conversely, where costs are extremely low, strong cooperation is expected to 
exist. This means that cooperation can be plotted on a continuum ranging from no cooperation to 
strong cooperation. Figure 2 below is an illustration of the above logic. The shading represents the 
strength of cooperation which rises as the costs get lower. 
Figure 2: Illustration of strength of cooperation 
 
 
 
The question of form and structure of cooperation has intrigued academics for many years. 
In a bid to understand forms of cooperation, Charles Lipson (1991) was intrigued by the 
proliferation of informal cooperation arrangements and sought to understand why states would 
want to engage in informal cooperation. He observed that currency controls were largely informal 
since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971; he also observed that most of the security 
interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union was mostly informal. Lipson 
(1991:496) gives the example of the United States pursuing containment rather than “roll back” 
even at the height of the Cold War tensions and interprets it as “tacit acknowledgement of the 
Soviet Union’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe” demonstrated by American inability to aid 
resistance movements in Germany, Poland and Hungary and its failure to deter their forcible 
suppression. According to Lipson (1991:498)  
The very informality of so many agreements illuminates the basic features of 
international politics. It highlights the continuing search for international 
                                                 
4 Airports constitute international territory as they are a point of entry for foreigners. 
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cooperation, the profusion of form it takes and the obstacles to more durable 
commitments 
Even though the whole idea of enforceability of international treaties has been questioned 
(Lipson, 1991:508), the very informality of agreements as observed by Lipson is meant to shield 
states from future changes in circumstances which might raise the cost of cooperation while at the 
same time not damaging relations between states. Lipson also observes two issues as follows: 
a) That the informality is best understood as a device for minimizing the impediments to 
cooperation and, secondly, that  
b) An advantage of an informal instrument is the ease with which it can be amended. 
Lipson’s work is an excellent illumination into informal international agreements. The 
nature of these agreements means that organizations can easily get out of them. The interest of this 
study however is on those agreements that have been reached formally and led to the 
establishment of an organization, as is the case in most international water basin organizations like 
the Okavango River Basin. 
One important insight that is gained from Lipson’s study however adds to the earlier 
observation that this discussion made - that organizations can be placed on a continuum depending 
on the strength of cooperation. We can therefore add that this continuum has explicit divisions - 
formal on the one hand and informal on the other. The part of the continuum of interest to this 
study is that which covers formal cooperation. Additionally, this continuum is not two-
dimensional. Lipson adds an insight which makes this continuum multi-dimensional and that is 
the government level at which the agreement is made (Lipson, 1991:498). So for example, we 
expect an agreement made by the head of state to be stronger than that made by a minister. This is 
because the head of state signals more political authority than that of a minister. Even though 
Lipson applies this only to informal agreements, this applies to formal agreements as well. As an 
indicator or measure of political will and commitment, the level of government at which the 
agreement was signed matters. 
Figure 3 below is a diagrammatic representation of the logic. This implies that where the 
costs are low and agreements are signed on a high level of government, cooperation will be 
strong. This is represented in the figure below by the top right side. In general, the higher the level 
of government, the stronger the cooperation. Likewise, the lower the cost, the stronger the 
cooperation. The weakest cooperation is represented in the diagram by the combination LL/HC 
(Low Level and High Cost), while the strongest cooperation is represented by LC/HL (Low Cost 
at a High Level). Considering that the configuration of costs differ from state to state, it is 
 
 
15
expected that in a multi-party agreement for example, each states schedule of costs will be 
reflected by the different positions they will occupy in the diagram below. 
Figure 3: Representation of interaction between level of government and cost of cooperation 
 
 
 
 
 
Another insight that we gain from Lipson’s work is the magnitude of the implications of 
non-compliance, in other words, the cost of not cooperating within a formal instrument of 
cooperation. Lipson (1991:511) mentions three issues which centre on reputation and credibility. 
Firstly, a state that defects from a formal cooperation agreement is perceived as an unreliable 
partner. It is important that states maintain their reliability as a loss of reliability might affect other 
cooperative agreements. 
Secondly, breaking a formal agreement might give rise to costly retaliation which might 
range from withdrawal of cooperation in one area to broader forms of non-cooperation and 
sanctions. This might be especially damaging if the states involved are neighbouring countries. 
Lastly, in Lipson’s words a state  
[m]ay recast national reputation in a still broader and more dramatic way, 
depicting a nation that is not only untrustworthy, but also a deceitful enemy, one 
that makes promises in order to deceive (1991:512) 
Clearly, these are extremely high costs associated with defection that states will want to 
avoid. This is especially so for states sharing borders like in the case study. Each of the states 
party to the Okavango River Basin Commission, share borders with one another. A functionalist 
approach to cooperation holds the view that cooperation in one area is only a step to cooperation 
in other areas and the issue of trust becomes important in the process (Alexander and Colomy, 
1985:14). In the case of water cooperation issues governed by river commissions, like the 
Okavango, the water sharing treaty has resulted in the formation of an organization. It is formal 
cooperation. States will therefore likely not try to defect. 
Lisa L Martin (1992) has also contributed to studying the particular forms of cooperation 
between international players. Martin (1992: 766) lists the four problems of cooperation as 
collaboration, coordination, suasion and assurance. She introduces the concepts of “institutions of 
HL /HC LC/HL
LL/HC LL/LC 
Key: 
HL – High Level 
HC – High Cost 
LC – Low Cost 
LL – Low Level 
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multilateralism” and “multilateral organisations” and adopts the definition of multilateralism as 
postulated by John Gerard Ruggie (Martin, 1992:767). (A definition and further discussion on 
multilateralism  is covered on page 18 below). Martin (1992) contends that multilateralism 
consists of three principles - indivisibility, non discrimination and diffuse reciprocity. The study 
returns to the issue of multilateralism later. 
Martin (1992:769) discusses collaboration problems as those that occur when the 
utilisation of common resources is contested because utilisation by one necessarily means less of 
what the other will be able to utilise. On the other hand, coordination problems arise where there 
is plenty available for everyone and the only thing that needs to be managed is the exploitation of 
such a resource (Martin, 1992:775). In a related discussion, Hasenclever et al. (1996:62) have 
divided issue areas into three broad simple categories namely security, economic wellbeing and 
the domain of rule. According to them, issues classified as dealing with economic wellbeing are 
most conducive for regimes because “divisible ‘gain’ rather than indivisible ‘power’ is at stake”. 
Hasenclever et al.(1996) use different terminology from that used by Martin. They use 
“Consensual” to mean a situation of scarcity where every state involved desires the same valued 
resource but cannot fully be satisfied because there is not enough for everyone. On the other hand, 
it is a “dissensual” situation when both the values and means of exploitation are not acceptable to 
every actor (Rittberger and Zurn, 1990 quoted in Martin and Simmons, 2002; Hasenclever et al, 
1996:63 and Rittberger, 1993:14). From the above, it is known that water resources in the 
Okavango fall within the issue area of ‘economic and well being’. This, therefore, explains the 
existence of the regime in the first place 
As implied by Martin, a convention is an institution of multilateralism while a formal 
organization is a multilateral organization (Martin, 1992:770). In a collaboration problem, 
“conventions alone without monitoring or enforcement cannot ensure cooperation”. It therefore 
means problems of collaboration are best dealt with by formal organizations. It is however not 
necessary according to Martin, (1992:776) to establish a formal organization if the problems being 
dealt with are coordination problems. This raises important questions for the study. It becomes 
necessary to find out if the existence of OKACOM was warranted in the first place by determining 
the kind of cooperation problems it is meant to deal with. This question is dealt with in chapter 
three on page 33. 
Even though Martin’s study and analysis was at a global level the insights gained are just 
as valuable for sub-regional cooperation structures like OKACOM. In her discussion of suasion 
problems, she conveniently brings up the issue of the hegemony’s impact on cooperation which 
clearly does not apply in this case considering the fact that none of the countries under study could 
 
 
17
be said to have tremendous power, however defined, to sway the opinion of other countries, nor 
are they displaying hegemonic tendencies. For this reason, suasion and assurance problems will 
not be discussed further. 
This discussion so far has revealed that there are different forms of cooperation 
agreements. It has looked at informal agreements and their advantages, however, the central 
interest of this study is on formal water cooperation agreements governed by a formal 
organization. As indicated above, states involved in these agreements will want to avoid the 
option of defecting, as they may not want to risk the cost of defecting. 
Accounting for the future is a very difficult endeavour particularly because of the different 
combinations of possibilities that might obtain from different actors. The same goes for 
negotiations towards formal agreements. According to Koremenos et al. (2001:781), the value of 
future gains has to be big enough for states to engage in a cooperative agreement. Out of the 
unpredictability of the future and the fact that states guard their sovereignty jealously, it can be 
confidently hypothesized that the cost of cooperation represented by the unpredictability of the 
future and associated costs of defection will affect the structure of cooperation that emerges. This 
is further reinforced by the recent securitization of the environment of which water is a part. 
Given that the likelihood of defection is low, it is plausible to argue that the cost of cooperation 
determines the structure of cooperation. 
Discussing structure and form as has been done here, closely relates to the work of 
Koremenos et al. (2001) about the design of international institutions. In their study, Koremenos 
et al. (2001:762) argue that states rationally design international institutions to further their own 
goals. This study agrees with them that the design is rational; however it differs in its proposition 
in a slight but important way. The study intends to prove that states rationally design international 
water agreements to protect themselves in addition to advancing their interest. Advancing their 
interests alone carries the connotation of maximizing gains which further connotes proactive risk 
taking behaviour, whereas the hypothesis presented here intends to argue that they rationally 
design the institutions to cushion themselves from unforeseen circumstances knowing that 
defection is not a likely option. The proposition in this study assumes a conservative, more 
cautionary approach to international cooperation. In the area of water cooperation, this has been 
defined as “Water Rational Cooperation”, where the logic of long term access to water 
overpowers the logic of a conflictual approach as it may not guarantee sustainable access (Alam, 
2002). Given Koremenos’ study, it can be further argued that the cost of cooperation determines 
the structure of cooperation through rational design by states party to the cooperation regime. 
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Turton (2002:94) contends that the Okavango River Basin Commission is not technically 
an institution because it does not satisfy conditions found in a definition of institution as espoused 
by Schmoller in 1900 (Turton, 2002:94), and also because of the fact that it does not have a 
permanent secretariat and funding mechanism (Turton, 2002:95). However, this was the case in 
2002. While OKACOM may not have had a permanent secretariat and funding mechanisms then, 
it now does. The secretariat was established in April 2005 (see chapter three for a detailed 
discussion). This therefore brings an important point which Turton also highlights, namely that 
regimes evolve with the complexity of cooperation problems they are tackling (Turton, 2002: 95). 
This is also a fact that the study will not take for granted, namely that regimes or transboundary 
organizations are in a constant flux and these changes are being carefully monitored by member 
states. 
Organisations that emerge out of international agreements like the Okavango River Basin 
Commission and other commissions are what Martin (1992:767) calls Multilateral Organisations 
(MO) as oppossed to conventions and agreements - formal or informal - to which she refers to as 
Institutions of Multilateralism (IM). Before this study can constructively engage in the debate 
about the design of these multilateral organizations, it is important to get acquainted with the way 
they operate. The following section will review the issue of multilateralism by looking at the three 
principles that were highlighted earlier on. 
2.3  Multilateralism 
John Gerard Ruggie, a neo-liberal institutionalist, has written extensively about 
multilateralism (see Ruggie, 1998). He is generally critical of the absence of the discourse of 
multilateralism in the discussion of regimes and institutions as it is a “core feature of current 
international institutional arrangement” (Ruggie, 1998:105). He notices that whenever 
multilateralism is mentioned in the literature, it is mentioned in its nominal form i.e. definitional 
instead of the more qualitative forms like its features which make it an “institutional fact”. 
According to Ruggie (1998:109), therefore, multilateralism refers to: 
An institutional form, which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis 
of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct - that is principles, which specify appropriate 
conduct for classes of action without regard to the particularistic interest of the parties or 
the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence 
This definition can be divided into three essential factors, which, if present, would 
constitute a multilateral organisation in Ruggie’s sense. The study specifically draws on Ruggie’s 
conception because Martin (1992) used the word in a more nominal, as opposed to a substantive, 
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sense (Diebold, 1988 cited in Ruggie, 1998:105) or qualitative form. An institution is a 
multilateral institution if it: 
a) Coordinates relations among three or more states 
b) Uses ‘generalized’ principles of conduct 
c) Reduces or eliminates account of particularistic interests 
Given these definitions, an important question emerges: is the organization under study a 
multilateral organization? Firstly, the Okavango River Basin Commission coordinates relations 
between three states namely Angola, Botswana and Namibia. Secondly, according to de Wet et al. 
(2008:45), the commission’s mandate is to investigate the pre-requisites and set up conditions. 
This therefore means that whatever conditions will be set, will be purely based on the research or 
investigation carried out without account of ‘particularistic interests’ that might be prevailing in 
the member countries. It means therefore that relations among these states will be objectively 
guided by the findings of the commission. 
This leaves out the generalized principles of conduct. The principles of multilateralism 
include indivisibility, non discrimination and diffuse reciprocity. One of the difficulties of 
applying these principles to an organization like OKACOM is that the definition of the principles 
of multilateralism as we know it today, has largely resulted from the collective security discourse 
(Ruggie:1998:112 and Martin, 1992:767), which makes the application of indivisibility 
problematic. The other principles of non-discrimination and diffuse reciprocity are especially 
reflected in the design of the organization with the chairpersonship rotating among the three 
member countries and the secretariat also being hosted on a rotational basis (de Wet et al., 2008). 
Having looked at the more theoretical discussion, this study now turns to review available 
literature with a view to identifying gaps in the literature. This is dealt with in the following 
section. 
2.4  Strategic considerations in Transboundary River 
Cooperation – A Review of Literature 
This section will review available literature on regime formation processes in the 
management of transboundary rivers. While it is recognised that much can be learned from 
reviewing a range of literature with respect to geographical dispersion, for the sake of precision, 
this review will restrict itself to literature relevant to Southern Africa.  
Regime formation starts at the process that spells the framework of cooperative 
arrangements in transboundary river management on the global level. This is the level, for 
example, of the United Nations at which the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non 
 
 
20
Navigational Uses of the International Water Courses was deliberated. At this level, strategic 
considerations are expressed through the system of voting. Eckstein (2002) notes that these 
strategic considerations, such as economic, geographic and other national interests have had the 
result that the future of the convention is uncertain. The convention will enter into force after the 
ratification, approval or accession of 35 countries. By 2002, only 12 countries had ratified 
(Eckstein, 2002). WWF International reported that the convention was short of 18 parties for the 
convention to enter into force in 2007 (WWF, 2009).  
At the regional revel, the mechanism is the same where member states express their 
opinions through voting. Strategic considerations do not seem to have had such a high profile 
effect at the SADC level evidenced by the fact that on the two occasions the protocol has been 
presented for ratification, ratification has happened without major problems. This might be 
because as a region, there are already many cooperative arrangements so that arriving at 
agreements may not be as difficult, facilitated by the regional integration process. 
While at the UN Convention level and the regional level, the impact of strategic 
considerations like sovereignty are manifested in the progress (slow / fast) to enforcement of the 
convention, at the basin level, the impacts are less clear. This is firstly because basin countries 
share boundaries and therefore by extension a history of intercourse. This intercourse might be 
positive or negative. There might be prior hostilities or cooperative arrangements which will 
greatly impact the approach taken towards other neighbours. Secondly, sharing resources like 
transboundary rivers raises questions intimately linked to state sovereignty. States guard their 
sovereignty jealously such that any dealings which might affect state sovereignty are equated to 
issues of national security. This makes the behaviour of states unpredictable and worth studying to 
reveal any underlying patterns.  
Turton (2003) provides an excellent starting point for studying river basin institutions. He 
explores the link between water and the securitisation discourse.  His work draws from the work 
of Buzan (1991) and Schultz (1995). From this review, Turton notes that the process of 
securitization of resources required that these resources be framed as existential threats, which 
would then categorise them into special resources beyond regulation using ‘normal’ rules. Just 
like the concept of security complex, Turton argues that in Southern Africa, there is a 
hydropolitical complex. A security complex has been defined as a “set of units whose processes of 
securitization, desecuritization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be 
analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, 1998 cited in Turton, 2003). This has been 
further refined to apply to water in the hydropolitical security complex sense and is defined as 
“those states that are geographically part 'owners' and technical 'users' of rivers and further, as a 
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consequence, consider the rivers as a major national security issue” (Schultz, 1995 cited in Turton, 
2003). Generally, Turton does not support the idea of securitization of resources and looks at the 
development of institutions as a good way of desecuritizing resources and politicising them, which 
is generally viewed by him as a good thing. The involvement of SADC, which can be viewed as a 
security community (Ngoma, 2005:10) in water management as an institution therefore 
paradoxically desecuritises water. 
Several works have been done specifically focusing on Southern Africa and the Okavango 
basin in particular. Notable among these are three books, edited by Turton and Henwood (2002), 
another edited by Nakayama (2003) and the third one edited by Turton et al. (2003). Turton and 
Henwood (2002) and Nakayama (2003) focus on Southern Africa as a region while Turton et al. 
(2003) focus on the Okavango River Basin.  
In Turton and Henwood, a contribution by Wester and Warner (2002) stands out. Wester 
and Warner (2002:61) contend that while the river basin approach and public participation are 
accepted precepts in river basin management, the form of institutions supposed to manage these 
river basins is not as self-evident. They argue that the approach taken by most organisations and 
experts is meant to depoliticise river basin management. These organisations and experts argue 
that basin boundaries are a given by nature. This approach has led to the formation of institutions 
that are difficult to sustain because of the overlap between basin and state boundaries (Wester and 
Warner, 2002:63). Since environmental use and especially water use is a matter of a choice 
between several alternatives by the state, this necessarily makes water management a political 
issue and therefore, it is not possible to depoliticise it. Wester and Warner (2002) identify three 
most occurring organisational models namely hydrological, administrative and coordination 
models. In the hydrological model, all the structures of the river basin management are based on 
the hydrological boundaries with all decision-making centralised in one agency. The 
administrative model is the opposite of the hydrological model where management is the 
responsibility of states, regions, districts, etc. with political boundaries as the determining factor. 
Lastly in the coordination model, management is coordinated by river basin councils or 
coordinating bodies. 
The study is useful in illuminating the several management models that are available, and 
the fact that it is possible to make policy for a basin without the presence of a basin policy maker 
(Wester and Warner, 2002: 67). The study does not however, shed any light on how this can be 
done across countries and what complexities might arise as a result. 
Molden and Merrey (2002), in their contribution to the volume, highlight the difficulties of 
institutional up-scaling in geography and size. They emphasise that in Africa, the skills necessary 
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for establishment of small-scale local water users organisations might not be transferable in 
geographical scale to basin-wide user organisation because in order to succeed, there is need for a 
more educated populace, adequate human resources, shared language and culture, good physical 
infrastructure, effective legal and institutional frameworks and strong community institutions. 
Apart from its Eurocentric aftertaste, the work of Molden and Merrey falls more within the 
depoliticising literature as it does not look at the political side of river basin management, which is 
at the centre of this study. Politics, in their work only comes in to facilitate what planners have 
planned – political will to act (Molden and Merrey, 2002:155). 
In the work edited by Turton et al., (2003), Turton (2003) makes a contribution that 
discusses the concepts of negative and positive peace and the desecuritization of water discourse 
and putting it back in the domain of politics where it belongs. This links nicely with the discussion 
he started above about a hydropolitical complex. For instance, Turton differentiates between 
security of supply in a situation of positive peace and negative peace in the way it is viewed by 
other riparian states. In a situation of negative peace, attempts to improve security of supply are 
interpreted by other riparian states as insecurity of supply for them. However, in a situation of 
positive peace, a coordinated basin-wide planning approach increases the security of supply for all 
riparian states. According to Turton (2003), threat perceptions also differ depending on the 
conditions of peace that are prevailing. Competition is dominant as a standard threat perception in 
negative peace while in positive peace, it is not. Turton further discusses the development of the 
Okavango River Basin Commission in the context of a hydropolitical complex which he argues 
exists in the region to securitize water management. The hydropolitical complex is analogous to 
the security dilemma (Snyder, 1984 and Glaser, 1997) in that it involves trust and interpretation of 
actions between states. While I agree with Turton that river basin management desecuritizes water 
management and politicises it, I find it hard to agree with his characterisation of conditions of 
negative and positive peace. There is not such a clear divide at any one time between the so called 
positive and negative peace given the multiplicity of state relations which might affect perceptions 
of the other. Nevertheless, Turton does not go further than this to look at the role that political 
considerations play in international river basin management in Southern Africa or indeed in the 
Okavango.  
Mbaiwa et al. (2008) discuss the impact of environmental institutions on the livelihoods of 
households and individuals that fall within the jurisdiction of these institutions. In their case 
studies, they cite examples of the government of Botswana relocating inhabitants of the Moremi 
Game Reserve, which falls within the Okavango Delta. While their study is a good look at the 
institutional impacts at the micro-level i.e. household and individual levels, and while it makes 
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good contributions to our understanding of environmental institutions’ antagonistic relationship 
with communities, it was not designed to interrogate institutional forms.  It is also limited in scale 
to state institutions while this study is working more on the interstate institutions and the impact 
that political (strategic) considerations have in the way they are formed and maintained. 
In Nakayama (2003), most of the contributions are general, dealing with such issues as 
resource management (Heyns, 2003); public participation (Bruch, 2003); fresh water treaties 
(Giordano and Wolf, 2003) and other more general issues. There are, however, interesting 
contributions by Nakayama (2003), Turton (2003b), Chenje (2003) and Mohamed (2003).  
Nakayama (2003:102) looks at the roles that RBOs should play in a real situation as 
opposed to an ideal situation. He does this by covering the roles played in history and gives 
examples of real situations. Turton (2003b: 136) investigates the hydropolitical dynamics of the 
Orange River Basin. He covers the national interest with respect to South Africa’s hydraulic 
mission manifested through the building of a complex irrigation infrastructure and the inter basin 
transfer (IBT) largely as a result of thermal power generation. As will be seen in later sections, a 
hydraulic mission refers to a country’s deliberate drive to harness water resources for social and 
economic development. This has resulted into the linking of almost every basin in South Africa 
including the four international basins namely Limpopo, Orange, Incomati and Maputo (Turton, 
2003b:158, Institute for Water and Water Shades, 2009). According to Turton (2003b), this has 
had the impact that there has been a clash between the South African national water act, which 
regards all water as a national asset to be moved to where it is most needed, and other legal 
systems (Basson, 1999 cited in Turton, 2003b:150), which view river basins as a coherent whole 
with the water therein belonging to the riparians of that particular river. This is an example of the 
impact of political decisions on the use of water. It does not however tell us much as far as 
institutions are concerned. 
In a contribution to the same volume edited by Nakayama (2003), Chenje (2003) discusses 
hydropolitics in the Zambezi river. His discussion is general, looking at the historical impact of 
politics on cooperation in the Zambezi. The closest he comes to discussing institutional forms is 
when he discusses the composition of the proposed commission in the transboundary river. He 
voices opposition to the tendency of commissions being formed by personnel from water 
departments only (Chenje, 2003:201). 
Mohamed (2003) makes an important contribution, which relates more to this study, when 
he makes a comparative analysis of how geographical boundaries, economic capacity, river 
hydrology and political relations interact to affect the joint development of  international rivers in 
the Limpopo and Orange rivers (Mohamed, 2003:210). From his case study, he finds four factors 
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as affecting the functionality of cooperation, namely the type and structure of cooperation 
(bilateral versus multilateral); the objective and scope of cooperation; the interests of the different 
states in the basin; and lastly trust between states. His study is an important contribution as it helps 
to further focus the inquiry in the present study.  Special attention will be given to these four 
factors in the case study analysis to come in the next chapter. While Mohamed (2003) focusses on 
the failure and/or success in terms of materialisation of cooperative arrangements as a result of 
political and other considerations, the present study, in addition to focussing on the Okavango 
River Basin, focuses on the role that political considerations play in the form that institutions take 
and how the operation of these institutions is affected by these political considerations, something 
that Mohamed (2003) did not cover.  
Heyns (2006) examines the hypothesis that successful management of a river basin 
management requires a trialogue involving the political, social and scientific spheres. In his study, 
he concludes in support of the trialogue hypothesis asserting that without the trialogue, which is 
manifested in the Okavango River Basin Commission, an effective partnership would not have 
been achieved. This partnership, he claims, has promoted good governance. Heyns falls short of 
investigating the interests and agendas with which each of the members of the trialogue comes 
into the partnership. This study, in Heyns terminology, is an attempt to investigate the impact of 
interests that the political sphere of the trialogue has on cooperation. This is the gap that this study 
intends to fill. It will look at how strategic considerations affect the cooperation process and the 
need for continuous evolution of regimes to adapt to changing circumstances in order to remain 
relevant.  
2.5  Conclusion 
The review of regime theory in this chapter has looked at the core assumptions of regime 
theorists. Insights were drawn from theorists like Keohane and Mearsheimer in relation to their 
debate on regimes. It was noticed that regime theory represents the closest positions from Liberal 
and Realist based conception, with agreement on the major assumptions of the theory. In the 
definition of the regime, characteristics of a regime were highlighted for example the fact that they 
have implicit principles, norms, values and decision-making procedures. Implicit means that these 
principles might be in written or formal format or they may actually be informal, forming part of 
the organisational practice. Principles, norms and decision making procedures form the core of 
regimes.  
The chapter has looked at the theory behind international cooperation from both the 
neoliberal perspective as well as the neorealist perspective. The chapter has further elaborated the 
hypothesis mainly drawing on the work published in the journal International Organisations, that 
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deals with the form and structure of organisations. The conditions under which cooperation exists 
among states and the form this cooperation takes were discussed. 
In addition literature on strategic considerations in river basin organisations especially as it 
pertains to Southern Africa has been discussed. In the review of this literature, key concepts 
including the concept of a hydropolitical complex, have been covered. It has been observed that 
issues of international water cooperation belong to the political sphere as opposed to the security 
sphere. A desecuritisation and subsequent politicisation of water issues is therefore generally 
considered a movement in the right direction. 
While politicisation of water issues has been generally accepted as the direction to take, no 
systematic examination of the interests and agendas behind the politicians or state makers has 
been carried out. The current study is an attempt in this direction. Chapter three covers a case 
study of the Okavango River Basin for this purpose. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDY – THE OKAVANGO 
RIVER BASIN COMMISSION (OKACOM) 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter will present a case study of cooperation in the Okavango Delta. The chapter 
starts with a brief historical review of cooperation prior to the independence of Namibia to set the 
scene for what was to follow post independence. In this review, South Africa is prominent because 
of its colonial responsibility of administering South West Africa (now Namibia). It is also 
prominent because of its pronounced political and military presence during the time under review 
and its perceived ‘hydro hegemonic’ tendencies as argued by Turton (2005).  
After the historical review, the chapter will cover the regime formation process that 
resulted in the Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM). This part of the case study will 
cover issues dealing with the motivations for regime formation as well as the challenges that the 
process faced and continues to face. Later in the chapter, other actors that have contributed to the 
form and shape of the regime, over and above the three states will be covered. The purpose of this 
chapter is to demonstrate how states use regimes to protect their sovereignty and to determine how 
this affects the structure of cooperation. It will also be argued that if changes do not occur in the 
cooperative configuration, the regime risks failing. Central to this argument is the fact that 
OKACOM has not yet demonstrated its ability to solve cooperation problems it is confronted 
with.  
3.2  Historical Review (1920 – 1990) 
Water issues and water cooperation have a long history. Current practices and conventions 
take root in the Mar Del Plata United Nations Conference in 1977 from which other instruments 
like the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, with regard to development of water resources on the 
continent, are derived (Mutoti, 2001:1). The history of water cooperation and exploitation to fuel 
development in Southern Africa goes back long before the Mar Del Plata Conference. Between 
1926 and 1969, three agreements had already been entered into concerning the Cunene River 
between South Africa and Portugal, which was meant to “mobilize water resources in order to 
create the necessary energy infrastructure on which subsequent developments could be based” 
(Turton, 2005:6; Heyns, 2003:10). Later in 1979, the South African government planned to 
abstract water (the action of diverting water or a portion of it, from its natural course for purposes 
of agricultural, domestic or industrial use) from the Chobe River, a tributary of the Zambezi River, 
which would be channelled through Botswana into South Africa as a way of augmenting its water 
resources (Turton, 2005:8). However this plan did not materialise as there was a change, 
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spearheaded by Mugabe in Zimbabwe, in the attitude of the states close to South Africa that 
decided to form the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), in direct 
opposition of South Africa’s policy of apartheid. This grouping was also meant to reduce 
economic dependence on the minority white government in South Africa. With this kind of 
environment, the project would not continue. At this time the states that made up the SADCC 
were Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe (Turton, 2005:8) 
Southern Africa is prone to droughts. The issue of water found its way into the political 
arena of the SADCC in 1984 when the SADCC host, Kenneth Kaunda, blamed water scarcity and 
drought for the shortage of food and the poor prospects for agricultural development (Turton, 
2005: 9). This can be traced as the beginning of hydropolitics within the now Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) grouping. South Africa, as a ‘hydrohegemon’, as referred to by 
Turton (2005), was closely connected in the water politics of the region, especially given South 
Africa’s involvement in South West Africa, and the fighting in Angola. Attempts were made 
between South Africa and Botswana to reach economic agreements that would have included 
possible access to the Okavango River (Turton, 2005: 10). These agreements did not materialise. 
There have been, however, other agreements signed with respect to other international rivers 
between Botswana and South Africa. In 1983, an agreement was negotiated between Botswana 
and South Africa on the Limpopo Basin shared by the two countries. Mohamed (2003:222) 
contends that cooperation on this part of the delta started as early as 1967.  This agreement has 
evolved from the original Joint Permanent Technical Committee in 1983, to the Joint Permanent 
Technical Commission in 1989, and finally in 1995, it was replaced by another Water 
Commission (Heyns 1995 and Pallet, 1997 cited in Els and Rowntree, n.d). Botswana is also party 
to an agreement involving Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe on the establishment of the 
Limpopo Basin Permanent Technical Committee (LBPTC) signed on the 15th of June 1986 in 
Harare, Zimbabwe. This was not functioning until it was replaced by a second agreement in 1995 
(Mohamed, 2003:221).  
Upon Namibian independence, the Joint Permanent Water Commission (JPWC) between 
Botswana and Namibia was signed on the 13th of November 1990 (Heyns 1995 and Pallet, 1997 
cited in Els and Rowntree, n.d). Earlier in 1987, the South African government had entered into an 
agreement with the transitional government of Namibia on the creation of a Joint Technical 
Committee to oversee future projects in the Orange River (Turton, 2005:11).  
In Angola, prior to independence, the colonial government had indicated the potential for 
the establishment of 350 MW hydro electric generating plant and the irrigation of over 54 000ha 
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in the Cuando Cubango province which would utilise the head waters of Cuito River and the 
Cubango River from which the Okavango River emerges (Pinheiro, et al. cited in Mbaiwa, 
2004:1322). In Namibia, preliminary feasibility studies conducted by the Portuguese showed that 
there was a possibility of electing a 40MW hydro electricity generating station at Popa falls, on 
the Okavango River in the Caprivi Strip. The Namibian government has since adopted these plans 
(DWA, 1969 cited in Mbaiwa, 2004:1322). This is in addition to a South West African 
government water master plan of 1974 which puts in place the development of the Eastern 
National Water Carrier (ENWC) to connect and draw water from the Okavango River  (Heyns, 
2007b:154). 
At independence, Namibia sought to affirm commitments made by the colonial 
government between the Portuguese and South Africans about the Cunene River, a common river 
between Angola and Namibia. Out of this reaffirmation came the re-establishment of the 
Permanent Joint Technical Commission (PJTC) which would deal with the management of the 
Cunene River. This commission was re-established in September of 1990. Two months later, as 
pointed out earlier, the government of Namibia also signed an agreement with the government of 
Botswana - the Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC), to deal with management of 
common water resources (Pinheiro et al., 2003:115). The development of the Okavango Basin 
Commission owes its origins in the independence of Namibia as Namibia aimed to consolidate its 
hydraulic mission. A hydraulic mission is a deliberate attempt by a state to ensure security of 
supply with regard to water. It engages in strategies and long term projects that will ensure that 
access to water does not hinder development. The following sections will look at the processes 
which led to the development of the commission. 
3.3  The Development of a Water Regime 
Soon after independence, the new government in Namibia moved to renegotiate the 
treaties, now that it was a sovereign state. This led to the establishment of the Permanent Joint 
Technical Commission between Namibia and Angola on the Cunene River and the establishment 
of the Joint Permanent Commission between Namibia and Botswana on water matters of mutual 
interest (Heyns, 2007a). Water matters of mutual interest according to Heyns (2007a:6) included 
the Okavango, the Zambezi, ground water and other water related issues such as environmental 
protection of the Kwando-Linyati-Chobe river system through the joint Salvinia Molesta (Kariba 
weed) control program.  
The move on the part of the government of Namibia to renegotiate these treaties came out 
of the realisation of both its developmental needs and its geophysical realities. According to 
Heyns (2007b:154): 
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Namibia has an extremely arid hydro climate. The combined potential of Namibia’s 
internally generated surface runoff and groundwater resources are estimated at only 
500Mm3/yr. Recent estimates have shown that Namibia’s future water demand would 
exceed this figure by the year 2020 (Heyns, 2004). This means that Namibia must be able to 
draw water from the perennial rivers on its borders to augment the scarce internally 
generated water resources in the interior of the country (Heyns, 2002). 
The cooperation of the riparian states was therefore extremely important (Angula, 2003:7). 
This is because the only possible source of water was the Okavango River. Other alternatives 
include drawing water from the Zambezi or the Orange River, on which Namibia has already 
developed five (5) dams and is considered to be optimally exploited (Heyns, 1995: cited in Turton, 
2005:18 and Wolf, 2003 also cited in Turton, 2005:18). The water of the Okavango is meant to 
supply the capital city, and other inland developing areas. The sheer distance from the Orange 
River at the southern border with South Africa or the Zambezi in the northwest is prohibitive 
(Turton et al., 2002). In order to make this project a reality (abstracting water from the 
Okavango), it meant that Namibia had to hold negotiations with the two riparian states using two 
different forums. This meant complicated and time consuming negotiations. There was, therefore, 
a need to consolidate the two Joint Permanent commissions into one. Around this time, there was 
a paradigm shift within the area of conservation that advocated basin-wide rather than local, 
territorial or catchment focussed approaches. This paradigm shift provided further justification for 
the Namibian proposal. The Namibian government planned to propose the establishment of a 
tripartite commission involving the three riparian states.  
An opportunity arose when, in 1991, both commissions were meeting in Namibia’s capital 
Windhoek (Heyns, 2007a:6). A suggestion was made to both commissions separately for the 
possibility of merging them into one. The Namibian Government had already tasked Piet Heyns, 
then a civil servant of the Namibian government, to come up with a draft agreement for the said 
proposed tripartite commission (Heyns, 2007a:6). At the end of the respective commission 
meetings, a joint meeting was organised at which it was agreed that the tripartite commission was 
a viable plan of action. The Piet Heyns draft was adopted as a departure point for future 
negotiations (Heyns, 2007a:6). This first tripartite meeting set the foundation for the establishment 
of the commission. 
It is useful at this juncture to take a cursory look at the parties that were going to be 
brought to the negotiating table. Angola was the upper riparian. By 1991, Angola had been 
engaged in a civil war that had by then been going on for 16 years. The country had been 
effectively divided by the two main warring factions namely the Popular Movement for the 
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Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which was the governing party and National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Collelo, 1991). UNITA refused to recognise the authority of 
the MPLA Marxist government. In May 1991, after a year of negotiations, Cuba removed its 
troops and a peace treaty was signed by Savimbi and Dos Santos on the 31st of May 1991 
(Conciliation Resources, 2009). The Cuando Cubango Province was under the control of UNITA, 
while the participants in the water treaties were from the group controlling Luanda, the MPLA. At 
the time of the negotiations in 1992, there was relative peace as the country was preparing for the 
1992 elections. Overall, Angola is said to be water rich, according to Turton et al. (2003:9), 
straddling five transboundary river basins (Cunene, Cuvelai, Okavango, Zaire and Zambezi). Any 
environmental management of the upper reaches of the Okavango was impossible at this time as it 
was littered with land mines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs) (Turton, 2002). 
Botswana on the other hand had been experiencing sustained economic growth due to the 
discovery of minerals and was continuing the development of its mineral potential. Food self 
sufficiency was at this time an important issue. This is reflected in Botswana’s National 
Development Plan (NDP) 6, which covered the period 1985-1991 and which specifically mentions 
food self sufficiency to be a national priority. The subsequent NDP, NDP 7 also emphasised food 
security as a priority (Hasler, n.d). What is critical about these national priorities is the strategy for 
achieving them. In this case, these priorities would be achieved through increased flood plain 
agriculture and irrigation, for which the Okavango Delta was an important resource (Hasler, n.d). 
This is in addition to activities that were already happening in the Okavango delta including the 
channel clearing for purposes of tourism, undertaken by tourism operators and Department of 
Water Affairs. This channel clearing has been undertaken since 1966 until the present to enable 
navigation of the channels (Hasler, n.d). 
For Namibia, a reassessment of the plans made in 1974 had reconfirmed the need to finally 
connect the country’s network of water system known as the Eastern National Water Carrier 
(ENWC), to the Okavango which would provide an opportunity for the arid country to tap into the 
only perennial river within its sovereign territory (Green Cross, n.d). The government was also 
considering the development of hydro electricity at Popa falls (Mbaiwa, 2004:1322), and the 
irrigation of 15 000ha of land for agricultural production (Heyns, 2007). 
The joint development of the delta was also important, as it was the only way to ensure the 
protection of the near pristine ecosystem, which supports a variety of plants, animals and a large 
human population.  According to Turton et al. (2002:11), 
the Okavango river is but one component in a complex ecological web of cross cutting 
linkages. Embracing perennial rivers, seasonal wetlands and varying types of desert and 
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semi-desert, with water availability in both spatial and temporal terms being one of the 
fundamental driving variables. 
It was clear that the development of the Okavango River needed a coordinated approach in 
order to achieve sustainable use. However, after the initial meeting where it was agreed to hold 
discussions towards the goal of establishing a commission, it took more than three years before a 
convergence of opinion could be reached on the final text of the agreement (Hynes, 2007b:155). 
This was basically because of three principal reasons. 
Firstly, Angola was in a state of war. Water management was therefore not such a pressing 
agenda as waging the war. This meant that Angola was not able to make available its personnel to 
participate in the negotiations. This was therefore a question of capacity on the part of Angola, 
which made the water commission a relatively unimportant need in 1992 (Heyns, personal 
communication). Swatuk (2003:129) argues, however, that Angola’s passive participation in the 
process was not a result of the fighting. He instead argues that it results “from Angolan 
unhappiness with Namibian developments in the Cunene River Basin and unwillingness to expose 
its plans for the Cubango beyond Savimbi”. 
Secondly, the Botswana government already had an overarching treaty with the Namibian 
government which was supposed to cover waters of mutual interest including the Okavango 
waters. As a result, there was not enough incentive to work on a treaty specifically for the 
Okavango River (Heyns, personal communication). 
A third problem which is likely to impact the relationship within the tripartite for the 
foreseeable future, was the language barrier. Namibia and Botswana both use English as their 
national language. Angola on the other hand uses Portuguese as the national language. Documents 
drafted in English had to be translated into Portuguese for the Angolan counterparts to review and 
then translated back into English with the comments (USAID, 2007:16). 
Eventually however, an agreement was reached and on the 15th of September 1994, the 
Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM) agreement was signed. For Namibia, the process 
of abstracting water from the Okavango was one step closer, as Namibia had long realised that 
achieving this objective would be impossible without first discussing interests and building trust 
and understanding among the riparian states (Heyns, personal communication; Mohammed, 
2003). Heyns (2007b) notes the complexity of governing resources that straddle several 
boundaries and he observes that governance processes are much more complex compared to 
governance within one sovereign state. The complexity comes as a result of the different state 
interests that have to be reconciled in the process of cooperation. It was for this reason that 
regimes have been found to be salient in easing complexity of governance issues as identified by 
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Heyns, by ensuring that they are managed using established principles and procedures of decision 
making. The OKACOM agreement was yet another creation of a regime meant to manage the 
states’ relationship vis-à-vis the utilisation of the water resources that if used separately, would be 
prone to unsustainable use and environmental degradation. 
3.4  OKACOM’s Evolution 
In chapter two under the discussion of regimes, it was observed that regimes tend to 
evolve. They evolve with the complexity of tasks that are before them (Turton, 2002:94). The 
OKACOM agreement provides for the appointment of advisors by the leader of delegation. These 
advisors can attend meetings to advise the commissioners. It also stipulates that only three of them 
can attend a meeting at any one time. This has been made into a more permanent structure through 
the Okavango Basin Steering Committee. 
3.4.1  The Okavango Basin Steering Committee (OBSC) 
After starting its operations, the OKACOM, needed to manage several projects that were 
being implemented under its patronage. As the time for the commissioners was becoming 
stretched, the OBSC was established to take over the role of overseeing and guiding technical 
activities of these projects (Heyns, 2007b:157). The OBSC is made up of nine members, three 
appointed by each member state. A member state appoints one of the three delegates as a head of 
delegation, who becomes a co-chairperson of the steering committee. The chairpersonship rotates 
depending on the country where the meeting is held (Heyns, 2007b:157). The OBSC can, like the 
Commission, nominate other people to attend its meetings as advisors, with the exception that 
need dictates the number of people that may be invited under the OBSC, whereas with the 
commission, the number is limited to no more than three regardless of need (Heyns, 2007b:157; 
Treaty, 1994). 
3.4.2  The Okavango River Basin Commission Secretariat 
The process of evolution did not stop with the formation of the OBSC. In mid to the late 
1990s the activities of the commission and the OBSC were in their infancy stages. At this time 
there were few actions that needed to be dealt with (Heyns, 2007b:158). As pointed out above, the 
very functional requirement of the commission became its driver for evolution. It was realised that 
the amount of work that needed to be carried out to produce information necessary was enormous, 
coupled with the human resource requirement and associated funding (Heyns, 2007b:158). Heyns 
(2007b) compares OKACOM at that time to a government that did not have a civil service. 
Slowly, inefficiencies started manifesting themselves. One important mishap was the failure for 
the commission to approve a final Global Environmental Facility (GEF) report commissioned 
with the aim of carrying out a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA), meant to be a baseline 
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study. Although the work on the TDA was completed between 1997 and 1999, the final report was 
never finalised and approved by OKACOM (Heyns, 2007b:158). 
Issues like these led the Namibian delegation to submit a formal proposal at an extra-
ordinary meeting held in May 2003, for the establishment of permanent administrative 
arrangements for the commission (Heyns, 2007b:158). Further debate led the commission to seek 
funding for a feasibility study. A feasibility study for the establishment of the secretariat was 
finalized in April 2004. It confirmed the need for a permanent structure. The recommendations of 
the report were accepted by the commission. As a result, a memorandum of understanding to 
establish the OKACOM Secretariat was signed in April 2005. Meanwhile, the USAID Integrated 
River Basin Management (IRBM) project, an institution strengthening project, started providing 
interim secretariat services. The secretariat was handed over to OKACOM in 2007, with the initial 
funding for its activities coming from the Swedish Development Cooperation Agency. This 
funding was integrated into the support that was already being provided by USAID (Andreini, 
2007). 
The Secretariat has been tasked with activities which, according to Heyns (2007b) can be 
grouped into five functional areas. The first is related to administration, financial control and 
technical support, which can be said to be the ‘core’ secretariat duties. Secondly, the secretariat 
has been tasked with functions relating to provision of support to joint management of projects in 
the basin being implemented under the auspices of the commission. Thirdly, the secretariat has a 
coordination function which requires it to harmonise development activities in the basin and 
facilitate participation of stakeholders. Fourth, it has a communication function which includes the 
maintenance of a comprehensive database on the basin with a view to enabling a trialogue 
between the states represented by the commission, and academia and civil society. Lastly, the 
commission has been tasked with a screening function which relates to ensuring that decisions 
made by the commission and proposals for new activities are executed (Heyns, 2007b:159). The 
secretariat is managed by an Executive Secretary who is currently Dr. Chonguica (Chonguica, 
personal communication). It also planned to field personnel with competences in “water resource 
management, economics, social affairs, communication, awareness-raising, information 
technology, environment, legal affairs, capacity-building and training” (Heyns, 2007b:159). 
3.5  Regime Formation vs Cooperation Problems 
In the second chapter, it was discussed that the cooperation problems at the centre of 
regime formation affect the path of evolution a particular regime will take. One question that was 
asked in that chapter was pertaining to the kind of cooperation problems being faced in the 
Okavango Basin. From a review of the process of cooperation, it can be said that the basin has two 
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cooperation problems, namely coordination and collaboration. As seen from that chapter, 
coordination problems were said to be problems where there are enough resources for everyone 
such that the exploitation needs to be managed. On the other hand, collaboration problems were 
said to be problems where the resources are not enough, such that the appropriation of a resource 
by one party directly affects how much the other party can have (Martin, 1992:770). The work of 
Peter Ashton (2003) is most helpful in illuminating the coordination problem. After a study of the 
current and projected water demand from all the riparian states, Ashton (2003:11) found that: 
Given that natural flows in the Okavango River have varied by between 10% and 45% 
of the mean annual flow (McCarthy et al., 2000), a decrease in mean annual flow of 
3% [which is equal to most generous estimate of current and projected water needs] 
may not appear to be significant and, indeed, to be well within the “normal” range of 
variation in inflows. 
This means that the riparian states would be able to implement their current water plans 
without an adverse drop in inflows. The issue of access to water is a pure coordination problem. 
This finding is an important one as access to water is the most contentious issue at the moment in 
the delta. Ashton (2003:11) is, however, cautious and sounds a warning immediately which leads 
us to the collaboration problems. He continues that:  
the absence of sufficient information regarding the scale, significance and resilience of 
ecosystem responses within the Okavango Delta to decreased inflows of this 
magnitude makes it extremely difficult to predict with any accuracy or certainty the 
likely scale of responses to a sustained decrease in inflow. [emphasis in original] 
As far as water is involved, coordination is the problem confronted by the delta. When it 
comes to biodiversity maintenance, the delta is confronted with a collaboration problem. This is 
because unilateral actions by a riparian state, for example dam construction in the head waters or 
extensive irrigation would have important consequences for the rest of the delta. This might likely 
be less of a problem once sufficient information as regards the long term impacts of water 
abstraction becomes available. This points to the salience of information in sustaining the regime. 
The kind of problems to be managed should ideally dictate the path of evolution of a 
regime. In this case, the OKACOM needs to develop institutions that can monitor use of the basin 
with regards to biodiversity maintenance. It also needs to develop enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure that this biodiversity remains viable. 
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3.6  Obstacles to Cooperation in the Okavango River 
Basin Commission 
Cooperative arrangements are more likely to succeed if participants to a cooperating issue 
are able to build trust amongst themselves. Two important issues were acting as disincentives to 
cooperation in the delta. One issue, which will be dealt with first, has also been identified as an 
issue that makes cooperation much more difficult in Alam’s (2002) study of transboundary river 
cooperation between India and Pakistan, and that is the existence of a bellicose situation. 
3.6.1  Bellicosity between Botswana and Namibia 
Namibia and Botswana were caught in a dispute with both projecting sovereign claim over 
the Kasikili/Sedudu5 Island. The Kasikili/Sedudu Island is found in the Chobe-Linyati area, close 
to the Caprivi Strip in the north east of Botswana (Green Cross, n.d). It is claimed that both 
governments moved their troops to the area to reinforce their claims and that shots were fired. The 
dispute was referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and settled in favour of Botswana 
(Green Cross, n.d). The fact that Namibia agrees to this settlement downplays the effect that this 
was likely to have had on the cooperation in water. It may be possible that anticipated cooperation 
in water might be responsible for Namibia’s acceptance of this settlement. The other view, 
especially as postulated by Swatuk (2003), that the dispute seems to be settled only because no 
real national interests were negatively affected, is also possible. 
3.6.2  Misinformation and threatened Livelihoods 
In 1994/95 and 1995/96 rainfall season, Namibia experienced an extraordinary dry spell, 
which resulted in a poor run-off thereby reducing the amount of water stored for use. This kicked 
into action Namibia’s plan of connecting the Eastern National Water Carrier (ENWC) system to 
the Okavango as an emergency project to supply the capital city, which at one point was left with 
only one month of water supply (Journeyman Pictures, 1997). The government of Namibia 
considers the Okavango River as an insurance policy against any unforeseen water shortages 
inland. This plan (of water abstraction) could not be implemented for several reasons, principal 
among them being the fact that the following rainy season produced enough water and removed 
the immediate need for the implementation of the emergency plan. Secondly, the government of 
Botswana objected to the plan, insisting that further and more detailed studies should be taken to 
determine the harm this project would do to the ecosystem (Mbaiwa, 2004:1322; Wormuth and 
Buffle, n.d:8). It is important to note that Botswana’s interests, as we will see below, had now 
changed, favouring more the protection of the ecosystem as a driver for the burgeoning tourism 
                                                 
5 Kasilili is the name of the island as it is called in Namibia, while Sedudu is the name of the same island as it is 
known in Botswana. 
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industry. While many commentators (Turton, 2003; Heyns, 2007) downplay this potential conflict, 
it is important to highlight that this brought to the fore the kind of emotions the issue of 
exploitation of the Okavango river arouses. The media is blamed for misinforming the public 
about the realities on the ground (Turton et al., 2002:12). As an example, having heard about 
Namibia’s intention to abstract water from the Okavango River, the communities from 
Ngamiland, the district in which the Okavango Delta is situated, wrote a petition to the 
government of Botswana protesting against Namibia’s intentions. They were protesting on the 
basis that abstraction would adversely affect their livelihoods downstream (Kgosi Tawana II, 
1998). This was not helped by stories that were circulating in the media that Namibia had signed 
an agreement with Angola which specified what was to be done by the two states in the case of a 
confrontation with Botswana and what to do if South Africa were to come on the side of Botswana 
(The Namibia Economist, 29 September, 2006). The government of Namibia strongly refuted the 
allegations. 
This disagreement is an example of conflicting priorities of the riparian states. While the 
priority of the Namibian government was water supply to the population, that of the Botswana 
government was the protection of the ecosystem for tourism. This is an issue that still poses 
challenges in the regime as reflected by the 2007 evaluation of USAID’s assistance to the 
Commission. The report indicates that:  
as USAID negotiates program design and implementation agreements with its partners, it 
has found that biodiversity protection is currently a high priority for only one of the three 
countries (Botswana) (Andreini, 2007) 
The report downplays this problem as a manageable one but admits that such problems 
have added complexity to project development and management (Andreini, et al., 2007). 
Attention has to be paid, however, to what lies beneath basic expressions of interest in order to 
unravel real problems. Botswana’s change to ecosystem protection and opposition to Namibia’s 
abstraction of water upstream, does not reflect a ‘greening’ on the Botswana government’s side, - 
rather it is as a result of financial rewards realised from tourism as well as its failure to push 
through its own “Southern Okavango Integrated Management Project” which was meant to 
withdraw an amount of water from the delta (Swatuk, 2003). 
3.6.3  Angolan Civil War and Current Angolan Government 
Posture 
The Angolan civil war was generally a threat to cooperation in that while the country is the 
largest contributor of water to the entire basin system, it had neither time nor resources to fully 
dedicate to the negotiations and cooperation initiatives. As indicated earlier, the province in which 
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the Cuito and Cubango River rises belonged to the rebel UNITA group. The other states took a 
risk in negotiating with the MPLA as there was a certain level of probability that they could have 
been defeated. This could have derailed the cooperation and affected the relationship with the new 
powers for lack of trust of not cooperating with them when they were in control of the province. 
The Angolan state is now at peace. As indicated earlier, there are competing priorities in 
order to kick-start the economy. Projects like the Okavango rely on the political will of the 
government in order to succeed. According to Swatuk (2003:130) “[i]t is no exaggeration to say 
that maintaining the health of the Okavango Delta is about as far away from Angolan government 
policy-making circles as an issue can get”.  This implies that even though the government might 
have provided commissioners to OKACOM, it does not consider this as a high priority issue. The 
discussion from the previous chapter about the level of leadership that takes part in agreements 
particularly applies to the case of Angolan participation. As pointed out by Swatuk (2003:135), 
Angolan state makers will be asking why they should not use the water of the Cubango or Cuito 
for that matter, when it is Botswana that is reaping the benefits from tourism. He also points out 
that as long as state representatives to these regimes are positioned in relatively powerless 
positions, reneging on the regime is always a possibility. 
3.6.4  Language 
As indicated earlier, English is an official language in two of the three cooperating 
countries, namely Botswana and Namibia. Angola’s lingua franca is Portuguese. Heyns (2007b) 
has cited delays in translations between Portuguese and English as having been one of problems 
encountered in the cooperation initiative. 
3.6.5  Diversity of Interests and the Logic of Development 
The USAID report referred to above, highlights that differences have been observed in 
terms of priorities of the riparian states. This is the same observation that Muhamed (2003) made 
in his comparative assessment of the collaborative arrangements in the Limpopo and Orange River 
Basin. The USAID report has given the example of Namibia being concerned more with ensuring 
security of supply issues6 i.e. the abstracting of water from the Okavango and the development of 
a hydro electricity power plant at Popa Falls, whereas Botswana is more concerned with the 
biodiversity of the delta as a priority. Namibia’s interests fall within a larger 1950’s logic of a 
‘mega project’ development approach - for example irrigated cash crop agriculture, power plants, 
and producer-driven commodity chain production (Swatuk, 2003). Within the context of 
conservation, Namibia’s logic of development becomes difficult to achieve because of actors 
operating in the Okavango who vehemently want to oppose particular development paths which in 
                                                 
6 Turton discusses this at length in Turton (2003). 
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the African context is short of denying the right to develop for Africans. Ironically, these 
organisations come from and are funded by, developed countries. A discussion of these actors is 
covered on page 45 below. 
The OKACOM agreement provides in Article 1.3 that parties to the agreement have to 
notify the commission of any proposed developments in the delta. The Government of Botswana 
however, unilaterally announced the Okavango delta as a Ramsar site (Swatuk, 2003). This 
rightly, according to Swatuk, left a bitter taste in the mouths of the other OKACOM partners as it 
went against the spirit of what OKACOM was set up for. This is an example of Botswana 
protecting its economic sovereignty especially as far as revenues from tourism are concerned. 
Botswana’s benefits will continue flowing in for as long as the delta as an ecosystem is viable and 
this can be ensured and protected by becoming a signatory to the Ramsar convention. If this was 
not the motive, why did Botswana only become a signatory in 1997, when the Ramsar convention 
has been around since 1971? Swatuk (2003:129) makes a valid point when he asserts that:  
“[T]he fact remains – sovereign states keen on post war reconstruction and overcoming 
the development deficit are unlikely to take kindly to outside interference in their 
development efforts” 
Many academics and experts on water would rather concentrate on the peace enforcing 
characteristics of international water cooperation, however, ignoring the equally present facet, 
conflict, which is after all the other side of the coin, is not going to make it disappear. It is 
apparent from the above discussion that there are underlying tensions among the cooperating 
states. The conflict dynamic needs to be taken into account in order to better understand the 
dynamic of cooperation. 
3.7  Drivers for Cooperation 
What therefore is driving the continued functioning of the regime? What can be identified 
as fuelling factors for continued cooperation within each of the riparian states? Swatuk (2003) 
identifies two factors, namely time and robustness of the delta as binding agents for continued 
cooperation. He argues that the delta is more resilient than it is currently thought to be. The 
complexity of the ecosystem makes it impossible to tell which changes have come about from 
human use of the delta. These changes have occurred over a long time. Time and delta robustness 
therefore, are two aspects that the cooperation still has in its favour. In addition, Swatuk (2003) 
points to the immense international interest, expertise and capital and other structures of 
cooperation like SADC, as push factors for cooperation. The role of external players will be 
covered under a separate section in this study. Meanwhile, the following pages will look at the 
driving factors for regime maintenance within each of the riparian states. In other words, what 
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makes cooperation worthwhile for each of states? These have been identified as new opportunities 
for growth in Angola, economic diversification in Botswana and population growth in Namibia. 
3.7.1  Angola 
In Angola, the government has an opportunity to resettle populations and kick-start 
development in the upper reaches of the Okavango Basin. This might involve the resettlement of 
hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and also the use of the rivers for 
hydro-electricity generation and irrigation.  
After the independence of Angola, a civil war was waged in Angola for a total of 27 years. 
The result of the war has been the death and injuring of millions of Angolans, displacement and 
thousands of refugees in neighbouring countries (Porto and Clover, 2003: 67), notwithstanding the 
pervasive poverty and environmental problems as a result of the dislocation of communities and 
destructive effect of the war. Angola, despite its mineral wealth, is ranked number 162nd of the 
177 countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2008:232). Angola faces extreme 
challenges as it has to revitalize services in all sectors including health, education and 
transportation. It has some of the worst Human Development Indicators with the adult literacy rate 
at 32.6%, and a large percentage of children under weight for their age (31%) (UNDP, 2008:232). 
The end of war did not mean that Angola started to correct these ills. There was need to 
consolidate the hard-won peace by implementing a series of measures that would ensure that the 
country did not have a false start like the 1992 peace (WFP, 2002). It therefore had to engage in 
the demilitarization and demobilization of forces as a priority (Porto and Clover, 2003:67). This is 
the time therefore that Angola, after consolidating the peace, will be working towards improving 
the lives of its people. Even though Angola is not thought to be a water poor country, there is a 
large population that lives in the catchments of the Cuito and Cubango rivers, which are the 
origins of the Okavango River. The water in this area is absolutely crucial for the rebuilding 
process and starting over in agricultural production and re-establishing livelihoods. According to 
Porto and Clover (2003:75), the province covers an area of 200 000 sq km and has some 140 000 
inhabitants whose main livelihood system is based on agricultural production. Resettlement after 
the war meant that the population of the province was going to increase tremendously (Turton, 
2002). The waters in this region therefore have strategic importance in kick-starting the rebuilding 
process.  
Potential for hydro electricity and damming water for drinking are said to be considered. 
While Angola does not really need the cooperation of the other countries for its development, its 
activities will be crucial to the health of the ecosystem as well as the development potential of the 
other riparian states.  
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3.7.2  Botswana 
The main driver for cooperation for Botswana is the bid to diversify its economy from 
relying on minerals, which are heavily affected by world market fluctuations, to more reliable 
sources of revenue. Tourism has been identified as one of the sectors which does contribute and 
has the potential to incrementally contribute to the economy. Agricultural diversification is also 
another source of economic diversification, however, as will be seen below, both greatly depend 
on the availability of water. 
While Botswana has been hailed as a ‘development miracle’ (Africa Research, 2008), its 
development has been typified as mineral dependent (See Poteete, 2009). If an economy like 
Botswana is mineral dependent, it needs to ensure that it attains economic sustainability in order 
to ensure that development will continue even after the minerals run out or get vulnerable because 
of global markets. Economic sustainability as a concept is associated with the idea that national 
wealth is none decreasing over time (Hartwick, 1997; Pearce et al., 1989, Solow, 1974, 1986 cited 
in Lange and Wright, 2001:6). The government of Botswana has realized levels of income from 
minerals which have enabled it to increase its foreign reserves and it has been able to meet its 
national budget and development needs for the past 17 years without resorting to loans or public 
borrowing (Africa Monitor, 2009:1) 
Mineral wealth, apart from running out at one point, is also affected by world markets. 
According to Mathe (2009), because minerals like diamonds are luxuries, they are the first to be 
cut out of consumer’s budgets in response to unfavourable economic conditions. This is exactly 
what has happened with the demand for diamonds triggered by the housing sub-prime credit crisis 
in the United States (Mathe, 2009:10). According to Mathe (2009), this crisis has set off a domino 
effect which has gone as far as affecting the diamond market, which is expected to decline by 15% 
in 2009 (2009:40). Mathe (2009) continues that: 
Warning signs of hard times were seen on 30 October [2008] when DiamonEx received $20 
per carat for 10 612 carats sold in its inaugural sale from the Lerala Mine. This was against 
the valuation of $48 per carat…Debswana…was unable to sell any diamonds in November 
[2008] and only recorded ‘very low sales’ in December [2008]…Of the 32.6 million carats 
produced by Debswana in 2008, only 28.9 million were sold by year end… [t]he company 
shut down for four weeks beginning in mid December [2008] as a cost cutting measure. 
As a result of the underperforming markets, the government of Botswana has for the first 
time in 2009 failed to meet its budget and has negotiated a budget support loan from the African 
Development Bank amounting to US$1.5bn (Africa Monitor, 2009:1). It is also reported that the 
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country’s foreign reserves have fallen from a peak of US$10.3bn in March 2008 to US$8.2bn in 
February 2009 (Africa Monitor, 2009, 5). 
Botswana does not only produce diamonds. It also has other natural resources like copper-
nickel and coal, however, income from diamonds far outweigh income from other minerals. Lange 
and Wright (2002:19) have calculated the total mineral wealth of Botswana from 1980/81 to 
1997/98 in which they find that diamonds constantly contribute more than 94% of the total 
mineral wealth for all the years. Therefore, what happens with diamond marketing matters. 
The government of Botswana has not been caught unaware by the situation. It has long 
been recognized that it cannot depend forever on its minerals for development as reflected in its 
National Development Plan (NDP) 8 (NDP 8). According to the Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communication, “in the mid 1980’s the mining sector constituted 50% of GDP, whereas in 1994, 
it constituted 36%”. This is an indication that the government is diversifying its economy. This 
begs the question – diversifying into which areas?  
Africa Research Bulletin (2008) gives two possible areas for diversification namely 
agriculture and tourism. In the agricultural sector, Botswana is well known for beef production for 
export to the European Union. However general agricultural production contributes a very small 
percentage to the GDP. Nevertheless, this is one area that the government is diversifying into, 
especially small holder farming, given that no serious advancement have been made in this sector 
(see Whiteside, 1997). Beef exports, especially to the European Union, remain an important part 
of the economy in Botswana. Beef exports make up the bulk of the 1.6% contribution of the 
agricultural sector to the GDP. 
The second area for diversification is tourism. According to the Botswana Vision 2016 
(Government of Botswana, 1996), tourism is one of the areas that hold further potential for 
development. This sector, according to Moswete (nd) is the second largest revenue earner after the 
mining sector; she also notes that 75% of the international tourists visited the Okavango Delta. 
Botswana has a huge advantage in this area because of the status of the Okavango Delta. 
According to Turton et al. (2003), the delta supports a key component of the country’s burgeoning 
tourism industry, with a near pristine unique aquatic ecosystem internationalized as a Ramsar site. 
One factor common to all Botswana’s choices for economic development, starting with the 
main stay of the economy to the two possible areas for diversification is that they are heavily 
dependent on water. Beef production, the production of minerals and tourism, especially in 
Botswana, is heavily dependent on water. The main tourism area is the Okavango Delta, whose 
existence depends on the availability of water to maintain the viable ecosystem. Botswana has a 
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long history with water from which it has learned tough lessons which will remain part of the 
Batswana. 
Dahl (1981) reported that at the time of independence, Botswana experienced one of the 
most severe droughts which had lasted for more than five years. Dahl (1981:1) reports that on the 
day of independence, 30th September 1966, the situation was described by the Transitional Plan 
of Social and Economic Development as follows: 
Botswana is now experiencing the most calamitous drought in living memory. Its end is not 
in sight…it is reliably estimated that the national herd has been reduced by over one third 
and that the losses in some areas has exceeded 50%. More particularly a whole year’s crop of 
calves has been lost and it is calculated that it will need some five years for full recovery to 
take place…the present drought has brought with it famine, making one-fifth of the 
population dependent on international famine relief assistance…Heavy expenditure,…some 
20% of the total recurrent budget and over 40% of the internally generated Government 
revenue – is being spent on drought and famine relief and rehabilitation measures (Dahl, 
1981:1). 
The experience Botswana had at independence was a tough one, one that is likely to 
remain part of the institutional set up. This experience had taught the government and people of 
Botswana to attach a much greater value and importance to water. The importance of water has 
been codified in the naming of the national currency – the pula – which literary means ‘rain’. The 
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication (2001:19), in its initial communication to the 
UN convention on Climate Change states that: “[w]ater is the scarcest resource in Botswana, 
affecting many aspects of the nation’s development. Water conservation and demand management 
are key priorities in the National Water Master Plan.” Whiteside (1997), in his report on 
encouraging family sector agriculture in Botswana, reports that “[w]ater is an overriding 
constraint in Botswana”. Also in their study, Rahm et al. (2006: 158) note that: “Water resources 
are the most crucial of all environmental resources in Botswana…This is so because water use 
directly affects the utilization of all other major natural and economic resources”. 
Water therefore takes a central stage within the context of development in Botswana. Its 
scarcity acts both to incentivise Botswana to guard jealously any and all access it has to this 
precious resource while at the same time recognising that it is a downstream riparian, and 
therefore it seeks cooperation for sustainable use. 
3.7.3  Namibia 
The main driver for cooperation in Namibia is its population growth vis-à-vis available 
water resources. Namibian population density today is still considered one of the lowest on earth, 
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only second to Mongolia. It is estimated, for example, that in 2008, Malawi’s population density 
was 139 persons per square kilometre (Malawi Government, 2009). Compare this with Namibia’s 
population density in the same year of 2.4 persons per square kilometre (van Langenhove & 
Mufeti, 2008). Therefore, by all standards, Namibia is still very sparsely populated. 
Population growth is a function of three important factors, namely fertility rate, mortality 
rate and migration. According to the government of Namibia, Namibia’s fertility rate is among the 
highest on the continent. Namibia has a total fertility rate of 6.0, which is almost double as much 
as the world fertility rate of only 3.3 in 1990-95. The mortality rate has over the past decades 
declined owing to improvements in health, especially maternal and child health which has resulted 
in lower child mortality rates. The government reported that unless birth rates stabilize, the 
observed high rate of population growth will continue (Government of Namibia, 2002:7). The 
other factor that affects population as indicated earlier is migration. When net migration is 
positive, it leads to an increase in population, whereas if it is negative, it has the opposite effect on 
population growth. There are however two kinds of migration, internal migration, from one place 
to another within the territorial borders of the country, and international migration where one goes 
outside the country. Internal migration is an important factor in our discussion. Namibia has 
experienced a general population movement from rural areas to urban areas where people have 
moved to earn a living in the industries and service sector. This, combined with the natural rate of 
growth, has led the population in urban centres to grow at a very high rate, far exceeding the 
national population growth rate. 
The chart below shows the two rates of growth from 1950-55 to 2005-10 periods. As can 
be seen, the urban population has grown at a constantly higher rate than the total population 
growth rate. This means that there is a high rate of urbanization in the urban centres of Namibia, 
one of which is Windhoek, the capital city, with the highest population of all the urban centres. A 
higher rate of urbanization means that services also have to grow at the same rate in order to meet 
the demands of the growing population. One of these services is the need for water and sanitation.  
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Figure 4: Graph showing the Urban and Rural Population Growth Rates in Namibia 
Increase in population means increased investment in services designed to meet the needs 
of the population. This is a major problem that Namibia has had to deal with, especially with 
supplying water to the nation’s capital, Windhoek. A study commissioned to assess water use and 
availability in the city found that Windhoek was using much more water than was sustainable, 
evidenced by the lowering of the water table (Hellmuth, 2000:56). Rainfall over Namibia is 
typically characterized as low and variable and falls in short intense episodes so that infiltration is 
often very low (Jansson, 1991; Brown 1992; and Byers, 1997 cited in Wardell-Johnson, 2000:19). 
This very driver for cooperation might, however, turn into a potential spoiler. As can be 
seen throughout the case study, Namibia has always taken the leading role in all initiatives. This 
comes out of the perceived situation in which it considers itself to be, and that is a water scarce 
situation. Hasler (n.d. 6) contends that  
it is conceivable that these institutions and organizations [encouraging cooperation] will be 
ignored if strong political will exists to extract water, no matter what the political risks or 
social and environmental cost. This is the real politic of international hydro politics. 
[emphasis in original] 
It is however on this same political will that cooperation has so far persisted. Perhaps 
Namibia should pay more attention to those advisors that indicate the situation is not as dire as the 
government believes it is. Davis (2000) is one such advisor, who argues that the scarcity of water 
Graph constructed using data from the Population Reference Bureau (http://www.prb.org/Countries/Namibia.aspx.) 
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in Namibia is overrated. Davis (2002) argues that if water is the scarcest resource, then it should be 
priced highly, but in the case of Namibia, it is not, and if it is not, then perhaps it is not such an 
important constraint to development as we are meant to believe. Davis (2000:70) also confronts the 
practical examples which show that water is not as scarce a commodity as shown by the practice of 
giving huge subsidies to the most profligate water users and then decrying their inclination to 
waste water, the failure to price water appropriately and the protectiveness shown toward heavy 
users such as irrigators. According to him, this is an irrational use of water which indicates that 
water is not a scarce commodity. While this discussion does not refute Davis’s inclination, it is 
important to recognise that those “profligate” water users are the people that have power in society 
as well and therefore determine the distribution of resources as part of the power they hold. 
3.8  Role Played by Other Actors in the Okavango River 
Basin Commission 
While the member states have contributed much to the success and or progress of the 
Okavango River Basin Commission, it would be erroneous to attribute the entire accolades to 
them. Other actors have played an important role in propelling or further articulating the functions 
of the commission. Other actors can be broadly grouped into three main groups as Donor 
Agencies, NGOs/Civil Society and Academia. This section will now review the role played by 
each of the groups. 
3.8.1  Donor Agencies 
The United States Aid for International Development (USAID), Southern African 
Regional office, is one of the main donors that have been instrumental in the Okavango Basin. 
USAID has been providing assistance to OKACOM through a project called “Okavango 
Integrated River Basin Management project” (IRBM). This project comes out of the 2003 mission 
strategy document covering the period 2004 – 2010, in which a large part of finances have been 
dedicated to the Okavango (Andreini et al., 2007). The project is implemented through a US based 
Consultant – ARD Inc7.  
The USAID Mission provided interim secretariat services for OKACOM from 2006 until 
its hand over in 2007. The transfer to OKACOM was made possible with funding from the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Apart from the assistance with 
establishing the secretariat, the USAID project has been working in three areas as follows: 
a) Strengthening OKACOM member states 
                                                 
7 ARD is a wholly owned subsidiary of Tetra Tech, a leading provider of consulting, engineering, and technical 
services worldwide. 
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b) Information management for improved decision making and, 
c) Community participation 
In the 2004, 2005 and 2006, the project budget was US$2.5m, US$2.3m and US$2.2m 
respectively. In addition to the activities specifically focussing on the OKACOM, the mission has 
been building the capacity of personnel working in conservation in the delta (Andreini et al., 
2007). 
SIDA has also actively supported the evolution of OKACOM. After the establishment of 
the Secretariat, SIDA provided the initial funding for the secretariat activities for the first three 
years to the tune of US$2.2 million (IRBM, 2005). The agreement for the funding was signed at 
the 13th Annual meeting of OKACOM in Maun, Botswana (IRBM, 2005). SIDA continues to 
cooperate with the commission through other projects, mainly through the “Every River Has its 
People” project. 
The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) funded the initial Transboundary Diagnostic 
Analysis survey carried out by the Commission. Even though this was not properly concluded, the 
commission and the delta have continued benefiting from GEF though several projects, one of 
which being the “Regional (Angola, Botswana and Namibia) Environmental protection and 
Sustainable management of the Okavango River Basin”. The GEF contributed over US$5 million 
to this project (Project Document, 2000). The Global Environmental Facility is a fund that was set 
up as one of the mechanisms through which funding can be provided to counteract the effects of 
climate change. It is part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). 
The German Federal Ministry for Economic and Development Cooperation (BMZ) is 
active in the delta through the programme “Transboundary Water Management in SADC” , 
implemented by the German Development Cooperation (GTZ). The aim of the SADC-wide 
programme is to strengthen the human and institutional capacities for sustainable management of 
water resources (Meinier, 2009). The Okavango River Basin has benefitted from GTZ, especially 
from its sub regional project targeting mainly capacity building for information production. 
3.8.2  NGO/Civil Society/IGOs 
The Okavango Delta is protected under the Ramsar convention as a world heritage site. 
The importance placed on the delta internationally has seen several international nongovernmental 
organisations and intergovernmental organisations establishing projects in the delta with 
conservation as a central objective. The number of environmental NGOs, both international and 
local, operating in the delta is large such that it would not be possible to profile each and every 
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one of them here. It is important however to mention the existence of larger institutions like Green 
Cross and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).  
Green Cross funded a large international programme called “Water for Peace” in which it 
worked in several international basins. The Okavango was one of the basins chosen. In the project, 
Green Cross encouraged interaction between OKACOM, as the official representative of the three 
riparian states, academia and civil society. One result of the project was the production of a book 
titled “Transboundary Rivers, Sovereignty and Development – Hydropolitical drivers in the 
Okavango River Basin” (Turton et al., 2003). This book is a collection of essays on the Okavango 
delta and contains valuable information which in itself is a step towards advancing peaceful 
cooperation in the delta as it is a way of constructively debating contentious issues in the open. 
Additionally, the book makes information available for decision making. Information production 
is a core activity of OKACOM. 
With funding from the Japanese government, the Green Cross “Water for Peace Project” 
aimed at encouraging debate among stake holders to find practical solutions which can contribute 
to solving wider transboundary problems.  According to Green Cross (2003), the project was 
lending support to the river basin organization, which was aimed at enhancing the existing co-
operation process by linking OKACOM with the scientific, expert and civil society communities 
to help develop an integrated basin plan. The project focused on the problem that the basin was 
lacking an agreement to regulate the equitable sharing of the benefits derived from the resources 
of the basin. 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature has been operating in Botswana 
since 1984.  It is a union of governments, state agencies, NGOs and scientists working in the area 
of conservation. Apart from the main projects it is involved in, in Botswana, the IUCN plays a big 
role in the Okavango Delta Management Plan (ODMP) under the lead of the government of 
Botswana. The aim of the project is to apply the ecosystem approach through integration and 
participatory approach in planning (IUCN, 2006) 
3.8.3  Academia 
Universities, research centres and think-tanks are playing a very important role, that of 
generating information for use by policy makers and conservationists in the Okavango. The 
“Water for Peace” programme that was being implemented by the Green Cross International had 
the African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU), a research unit at the University of Pretoria, as 
a main cooperating partner. The Harry Oppenheimer Okavango Research Centre (HOORC), a 
centre affiliated to the University of Botswana specialises on natural resources management 
research (HOORC, 2009). It is staffed with expertise in the various technical fields including 
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political ecology, cultural heritage and tourism, remote sensing, physical geography, hydrology 
and many other specialisations. In the search for local solutions for local problems, the 
universities and centres are indispensable. Academics like Peter Ashton have helped clarify 
questions around what equitable sharing of resources (water) would entail in the delta (Ashton, 
2003).  
3.8.4  The Role Of Other Actors Revisited 
How does the role of these external actors affect maintenance of a regime? As can be seen, 
there is obviously to a very large degree a positive influence as pertains the maintenance of the 
regime. These external actors have provided the much-needed financial and technical resources to 
produce information vital for maintenance of the regime. The number, of these actors however 
might be a cause for worry. It has to be admitted that while they are all interested in conservation, 
most of them sometimes rely on the same sources of funding. This might create some kind of 
competition among the conservationists. The multiplicity of actors also leads to competition for 
visibility. The tactics involved in order to achieve this have not always been helpful.  At times, the 
objectives of these organizations and those of the governments with which they are supposed to 
work have been at loggerheads. These organizations have, at times undermined national decision-
making power by asserting that international interests have preponderance over national interests 
(Ashton and Neal, 2005:13). This is tantamount to undermining national sovereignty of the 
member states of the OKACOM. These conservation agencies have used the media as their 
information outlet, issuing press releases and statements. Swatuk (2003) points out that 
communication is a problem in the delta and that the release of parallel-unsubstantiated 
information adds to the already existing challenges. In his critique of the media and other external 
actors, Swatuk points out that, “[m]edia sensationalism and the arrogant, know-it-all approaches 
taken by conservation organisations, like the International Rivers Network (IRN), do more 
damage than good” (2003:130). 
3.9  Problem Solving, Compromises and Cooperation 
Problem solving is an aspect for which regimes are built. If there were no problems in 
cooperation, there would be no need for regimes. Problems in transboundary regimes can be 
defined as incompatible positions about an issue. For cooperation to occur, these incompatible 
positions have to change their basic characteristics to become compatible. This might involve 
renegotiation of interests held by one party in relation to the issue concerned. This section will 
analyse the process of problem solving and compromises in the Okavango river basin. Given the 
evidence in the case study, it can be argued here that the regime has since its creation not 
demonstrated instances where it has solved cooperation problems in the delta. 
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It was observed earlier that all the countries in the Okavango Basin have planned projects 
for implementation on the river. Namibia, apart from abstracting water to connect to the Eastern 
National Water Carrier scheme, is planning to use the Okavango for irrigation and electricity 
generation. Botswana had earlier planned to develop a Southern Okavango Water Supply project 
(Heyns 2003:17) and is currently using the delta for revenue generation through tourism. The 
colonial government of Angola had plans for using the upper reaches of the Okavango River for 
electricity generation and irrigation. Indications are that these plans have been adopted by the 
government of Angola (Pinheiro, et al. cited in Mbaiwa, 2004:1322).  
Of these projects, the Namibian plan to abstract water from the Okavango River has been 
the most contested. The Botswana government demanded that a detailed investigation be done, 
which led to the postponement of the Namibian plans. Postponement seems to have been the most 
common form of comprise in the delta. All the planned projects mentioned above have been 
postponed as opposed to being permanently discarded for better, more cooperative, plans. This 
means that these compromises are temporary in nature. As a case in point, the Namibian 
government believes that the Okavango River is insurance for water supply to the interior, the 
temporary suspension of the project is exactly that – temporary. It will in future use the water 
from the Okavango. Heyns (personal communication) argues that negotiations have been helpful 
in managing conflict8 in the delta; however, postponing projects can hardly be considered as a 
solution. Heyns (2003:17) has emphatically stated that Namibia will have to augment the supply 
of ENWC by 2005 and not later than 2009. 
 
3.10  Strategic Considerations, Regime Design and 
Operation 
The central argument in this study is that states design regimes to protect their sovereignty. 
From this case study, this section aims to isolate instances where states acted to protect their 
sovereignty. These instances can be identified both at the design level as well as at the operation 
level of the regime. At the design stage, the role taken by Namibia throughout the process of 
regime formation is an example of state influence of regimes to protect their sovereignty. At the 
regime operation stage, Botswana’s declaration of a Ramsar site without consulting member states 
of the basin is another example. These examples will now be discussed in detail starting with the 
case of Namibia. 
                                                 
8 Conflict here is used to mean “differing points of view” 
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3.10.1 Namibia - Need to ‘Ensure Security of Supply’ 
Instances where the Namibian government aimed to ensure its sovereignty remained intact 
can be identified on two occasions. Firstly, a review of the case study shows that Namibia has 
been prominently pushing through the idea of cooperation in the delta. It was the country that first 
moved upon independence to revitalise cooperation made with the Angolan government over the 
Cunene River. This action allowed the Namibian government to ensure sustained use of and 
access to the Cunene River. It also entered into a treaty with the government of Botswana to 
ensure there was cooperation over the Okavango delta. Namibia did this because it realised the 
fact that without the cooperation of these two governments, it would be impossible for it to tap 
into these sources of water (Heyns, personal communication). The government is, and has been 
since before independence on a hydraulic mission. As mentioned earlier, a hydraulic mission is a 
situation where a country seeks to mobilise water resources for economic and social development. 
This can also simply be called ‘ensuring security of supply’ (Turton, 2003:86). The situation in 
which Namibia is, i.e. its aridity and perceived water scarcity, facilitates an equation of access to 
water with national security. Realising that the ‘security of supply’ cannot be ensured without 
getting into a confrontation with its neighbours, it engaged itself in the process of regime 
formation as a first step. 
Secondly, it was important that the resulting regime be supportive of the hydraulic mission 
and not act as a hindrance. Firstly, in the articles prescribing the functions of the commission, 
Article 4 subsection 6, under the function of the commission, it specifically spells that the 
commission will advise on:  
Measures that can be implemented by any one or all the contracting parties to alleviate short 
term difficulties resulting from water shortages in the Okavango River Basin, during periods 
of drought, taking into consideration the availability of stored water and the water 
requirement within the territories of the respective parties at that time (Treaty, 1994). 
It is clear that this clause was included given the situation that Namibia was in. The Water 
Master Plan of the country is using the Okavango as an insurance for a source of water should 
there be need to augment the available water (Turton, 2003). The hydraulic mission of the country 
includes the development of a pipeline system called the Eastern National Water Carrier 
mentioned earlier. The pipeline, to be built from the Okavango is meant to feed into this system. 
Secondly, the commission by design is an advisory body, which means that while it can and 
rightly acts as a source of information which reduces uncertainty among the members of the 
regime, thereby reducing transactional costs, it does not have any mandate to reinforce whatever 
advice it gives to the members. Therefore, in principle, a member state can decide to contravene 
 
 
51
the advice of the commission if it felt compelled to. This gives Namibia pathways through which 
it will achieve its hydraulic mission and by extension, protect its national security and sovereignty. 
3.10.2 Botswana – Greening or Economic Interests? 
As has been reviewed in this case study, Namibia was forced to operationalise its plans of 
abstracting water from the Okavango River to feed into the Eastern National Water Carrier around 
1996. Even though a study was carried out to show that Namibia would be abstracting less than 
1% of the water, Botswana still insisted that a bigger study be instituted to show the effect that this 
abstraction would cause on the ecosystem of the delta. As a result, and as a matter of compromise, 
Namibia shelved the plans. As discussed above in section 3.6.2, Botswana unilaterally submitted 
to declare the Okavango Delta as a Ramsar Convention site and became a party to the convention 
in April 1997 (Swatuk, 2003:127). This has to be interpreted as a direct response to Namibia’s 
need to utilise water in the Okavango (Swatuk, 2003:17). First, as a lower-stream riparian, 
Botswana has no leverage over other members with which to incentivise cooperation. Therefore, 
by internationalising the Okavango Delta by declaring it a Ramsar site, the playing field becomes 
larger than the basin. It invites other international environmental players who would carefully 
monitor the activities of the other riparian states to ensure that the integrity of the delta is not 
compromised. Secondly, Namibia, as a signatory to the Ramsar convention, is bound to ensure 
that it does not carry out any development on the river which will jeopardise the site. It has been 
argued that Botswana did this in order to protect the revenues that it has been getting through 
tourism and that it is not necessarily a genuine change of policy on the part of the government 
(Swatuk, 2003). This has been justified by the fact that the Botswana government had over a 
quarter of a century in which it could have declared the delta a Ramsar site and it only chose to do 
it in 1997, a year after expressing objections on Namibia’s proposed abstraction of water from the 
Okavango. These instances show that in entering cooperation regimes, the consideration is on 
protecting state viability, the ability of a state to make decisions that will enable it to harness 
resources to provide for its people. This is the mark of sovereignty.  
3.11  Impact of Strategic Considerations – A Rationalist 
Regime theory perspective 
Both neorealist and neoliberal institutionalists agree on the assumptions that states are the 
ones responsible for the establishment of regimes and also that they are rational unitary actors (see 
page 7). This approach seems to hold explanatory power as all that has happened so far can be 
explained as activities of rational states protecting their interests. Using this approach, we can also 
anticipate the path of evolution of cooperation in the delta. 
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Until a detailed study can be done to demonstrate the possible effects of Namibia’s plans of 
abstracting water, developing a hydro-electricity generating station and irrigation of 50 000ha of 
land, these plans will remain exactly what they are - plans. This will be like that, as mentioned 
above, because of its responsibilities under the Ramsar Convention and other conventions like the 
UN Convention on Non Navigational Uses of Transboundary Rivers. This means that Namibia 
will not be able to benefit from cooperating in the delta. 
As far as Angola is concerned, it has been indicated that any likely action to develop water 
infrastructure like power generation, irrigation or abstraction for domestic use is likely to be 
strongly objected by powerful international organisations as a result of the international nature of 
the delta (Ashton and Neal, 2005:13). This also means that Angola will lose the ability to benefit 
from a regime which already offers minimal incentives. According to Keohane, a regime will exist 
for as long as those that are members in it can gain positively from participating in the regime 
(Keohane, 1985:167). From the above, it can be concluded that if the schedule of benefits does not 
change, the regime risks breaking apart. Ashton and Neal (2005:4) cite other studies that have 
reached the same conclusions including Ohlsson, 1995; Ali, 1996; Shela, 1996; Ramberg, 1997; and 
Turton, 1999. 
3.12  Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the process of regime formation and maintenance in the 
Okavango delta. On the persistence of Namibia, two separate Joint Technical Commissions were 
merged into one dealing with one common river basin – the Okavango river basin. Motivating 
factors for regime formation were seen to have been the desire for bridging a development deficit 
which would be made through the abstraction and development of a hydro electric generating 
station for Namibia, the potential of the delta for tourism for Botswana and the potential that the 
land and water hold for kick-starting development in Angola.  
Obstacles to regime maintenance also existed and still do exist. A history of bellicosity 
between Namibia and Botswana as well as the lack of interest in the policy making cycles of the 
Angolan government are some of the challenges. Critical views point to the opposition that 
upstream riparian states like Namibia and Angola might face in developing the Okavango River 
mainly from the conservation organisations and the unfair benefit that accrues to Botswana as a 
result of the proscription. This is likely going to be a major test for regime maintenance if not 
mediated properly. As it stands, regime maintenance seems possible if the question of benefit 
sharing is going to be addressed rather than equitable use.  
The chapter has demonstrated that states use regimes to protect their sovereignty.  This has 
been shown by the actions of both the Namibian and Botswana government pursuing their 
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objectives namely the hydraulic mission for Namibia and economic possibilities from tourism for 
Botswana. The pursuing of states’ interests has relegated the regime to the role of a tool among 
other tools (in this case other regimes like the Ramsar Convention) with which it uses in the 
process of protecting this sovereignty. 
Taking a rationalist regime theory perspective, it becomes difficult to see how the regime 
is being maintained given the huge differences in benefits derived from the regime. From this 
perspective, regime maintenance has to come from a source other than benefits. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter will conclude the discussion that has taken place in the preceding chapters. 
The first two chapters laid the groundwork to the discussion and tackled introductory questions, 
theoretical grounding and review of the gaps in the literature. Chapter three was the case study, 
which looked at the process of cooperation in the Okavango River Basin, mainly by examining the 
formation and functioning of the Okavango River Basin Commission which is meant to advise the 
member states on the appropriate use of the water resources in the delta. The main findings of 
chapter three were that states use regimes for their own ends. These ends centre on the protection 
of their sovereignty. However, this is true for two of the actors in the case study, namely 
Botswana and Namibia, while it is not apparent in the case of Angola. In Angola’s case, evidence 
suggests that the cost of cooperation is still very low hence its continued participation in the 
regime. This chapter will then conclude the discussion by first of all looking at how the strategic 
considerations have affected the structure of cooperation in the delta. It will also review some of 
the lessons learnt throughout the discussion. 
4.2  Strategic Considerations and Structure of 
Cooperation 
It has been shown in this study that states take into consideration their national sovereignty 
in cooperative agreements, especially how these cooperative agreements alter their chances of 
protecting their sovereignty. This is in line with Watson’s (2005:23) assertion that  
The state is the archetypal actor within the international economy, and every state will 
approach the process of negotiating international economics treaties from a perspective of 
defending its economic sovereignty. 
If this is the case, then how is the structure of cooperation affected? What does this mean 
in terms of the importance of regimes? In order to tackle this effectively, it is important to have a 
common understanding of the meaning of structure. Structure, as used in this sense refers to the 
organisational form that is a manifestation of the cooperative agreements among the member 
states. In this case, it refers to OKACOM. Stated differently, how do the strategic considerations 
affect the ability of OKACOM to become an effective medium for cooperation among basin 
states? 
One would have to say that its ability is adversely affected. First, as a result of strategic 
considerations, OKACOM does not have any real power to make binding decisions which can be 
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enforced. This is because it simply has not been given any such powers. This was built in at the 
design stage when it was designated as an advisory body. Secondly, even if it had the power to 
make binding decisions, it has no enforcement mechanisms (Turton, 2003:94). This is the case 
even against the background of the SADC protocol recommending that river basin organisations 
formed should have the ability to monitor compliance (SADC Protocol, 1995). This is a general 
fate that environmental and other regimes face, and that is the inability of states to accept 
hierarchical enforcement (Keohane, 1989:167).  
What does this say about the usefulness of regimes? Are regimes really necessary? As can 
be seen in the case study, regimes have been used like pieces on a chessboard. The aim seems to 
be to outplay ‘opponents’ who are, in the liberal sense, cooperating partners, into some kind of 
untenable situation from which they cannot untangle themselves. This is evident in the case of 
Botswana’s unilateral declaration of the Ramsar site, as well as the two states (Namibia and 
Botswana) calling upon the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to arbitrate in their boundary 
dispute. This is not to say that regimes are not important. One undeniable fact is that states will 
not engage in cooperative arrangements if they do not find them beneficial. In this regard, regimes 
are beneficial in as far as they allow the retention and circulation of information among 
cooperating members. This is important as it eliminates decision making within member states in 
a situation of complete imperfect information. This in turn lowers transactional costs on the part of 
states. This means that regimes are important in lowering transactional costs for states. 
Secondly, regimes play an important role in deflating tensions. It provides a forum for 
continued interaction of member states. Regimes have the ‘duck on a pond’ effect.  Above the 
surface, it is calm, collected, and peaceful and moving systematically, however, below the surface, 
it is paddling, heavily and fiercely. This paddling is responsible for regime evolution. In human 
societies it could be likened to deliberative interaction where dialogue has to continuously occur 
in order to move forward. The health of a regime depends on the nature and form of deliberative 
dialogue that goes on. 
4.3  Lessons Learned 
4.3.1  Regime Theory and Regime Evolution 
Using the rationalist approach to regime theory, it was possible to anticipate evolution of 
the regime. For instance, it was concluded that if the benefit sharing as an approach is not adopted 
in the delta, the regime risks breaking apart because the benefits are currently very unevenly 
shared. While regime theory from a rationalist perspective helps us understand or expect a path of 
evolution to be followed resulting from the combinations of rewards derived from the regime, its 
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explanation of the driving forces for cooperation especially from Angola’s side does not seem 
adequate. For instance, a rationalist approach will evoke the need for Angola to maintain its 
reputation as a good neighbour (Keohane, 1989:168). It does not state, however, whether this is a 
sufficient motivation in the long run and under what conditions this will be true. Alternative views 
have pointed at the fact that Angola has very little at stake in the Cuito/Cubango region as no real 
settlement has taken place yet (Swatuk, personal communication). Should we, therefore expect 
that the situation will change once the resettlement process begins? A cautious approach to 
answering this question is important. Currently, the cost of cooperation for Angola is very low. As 
discussed in chapter two, this in itself is an incentive to continue cooperating. However, should 
costs of cooperation rise, the dynamic of cooperation will be tested. 
4.3.2  The debate between Neorealism and Neoliberal 
Institutionalism 
The case study explored in chapter three seems to support the neorealists’ conception of 
regime theory with regards to two issues namely, on the impact of regimes on world order and 
secondly, the debate between absolute and relative gains. 
Neorealists object to regimes as important players in maintaining world order. They 
contend instead that world order depends on the foundations on which regimes are built (Little, 
2008:299). This is largely true in the case study explored here. I argue that the foundations 
referred to by Little (2008) above are conventions, with which Keohane agrees when he postulates 
that conventions precede regimes and international organisations, as according to him, states 
would not be able to understand each other’s actions in the absence of conventions (Keohane, 
1989:4). This is further evidenced by the fact that the study has arrived at the conclusion it has, 
namely that regimes are used like pieces on a chessboard. 
In the debate on absolute versus relative gains, the case study clearly portrays that the 
behaviour exhibited by Botswana and Namibia follows the relative gains logic. The focus is for 
example on what the states will lose, i.e. tourism revenue in the case of Botswana, while Namibia 
will have access to the water.  
4.3.3  Regime Power Play 
Continuing with the metaphor of a chessboard used earlier, it was seen in the case study 
that different regimes can act as different pieces on a chessboard with varying degrees of 
importance. This allows the use of regimes for or against other regimes depending on who is 
playing which piece. This was manifested in how Botswana used the Ramsar Convention to 
restrict, by, implication, the use of water resources in the Okavango Delta. The Ramsar 
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Convention by virtue of being a global convention has more supporters than the regionally 
specific Okavango treaty. The Ramsar Convention, being a global treaty, forms part of the sources 
of international law, and constitute, therefore, a basis on which Botswana can preclude the use of 
resources in the Okavango Basin by other riparian states. By internationalising the Okavango 
delta, Botswana has managed to expand its own power, at least temporarily. It has gained the 
ability, through the use of regimes, to balance its power with that of Namibia, which was mostly 
shown in the formative stages of the regime. Namibia displayed this power through agency, 
pioneering every cooperative engagement it was involved in. 
4.3.4  Hydropolitical Complex Thesis 
The case study reviewed in this study seems to support the existence of a hydropolitical 
complex. Both Botswana and Namibia are considered as pivotal states. A pivotal state is defined 
as one that is relatively economically advanced and tends to be in a drier geographical area such 
that it depends to a greater extent on internationally shared rivers as strategic sources of water. 
According to Turton, countries that fall in this category include South Africa, Botswana, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe (Turton, 2005:16). In our case study, both Botswana and Namibia are relatively 
more developed when compared to Angola. This could be one explanation for the low-profile role 
that has been taken by Angola. The case study supports the existence of a hydropolitical complex 
because issues of ‘security of supply’ for Namibia cannot be resolved without a subsequent 
solution for Botswana’s desire to maintain tourism in the Okavango Delta. This is the defining 
characteristic of a hydropolitical complex. The fact that there have been no compromises in the 
delta points to the status of both riparian states of being pivotal states. 
4.3.5  Continuous Evolution 
Another important lesson that can be learned from this study is that evolution has to be an 
integral part of a regime. Evolution allows the regime to recreate itself in order for it to remain 
relevant in tackling cooperation issues. For any kind of cooperation, compromises are an essential 
part as they allow opposing views to be brought in harmony in order for cooperation to thrive. 
Conflict is an integral part of that process. This is not really epitomised in the Okavango Basin as 
there has been no real comprises in the delta (Scudder, 2003:1). This makes the evolution of the 
regime even more important. The process of evolution will preoccupy the cooperation initiative 
with new issues to avoid reaching a deadlock on the old ones. Currently, the role of foreign NGOs 
is important as it allows the implementation of programmes under the patronage of OKACOM 
which in turn gives OKACOM relevance. 
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4.4.  Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research 
OKACOM is a cooperative organisation which seems to thrive in the absence of 
concessions or compromises. Compromises provide a way for cooperation to evolve. In the case 
of OKACOM, the postponement of interests has allowed cooperation to continue, which is 
atypical of cooperative arrangements. This suggests that cooperation in the regime is driven by 
other factors and/or actors than the three member states of OKACOM. These actors could be the 
international and national NGOs involved in conservation of the Okavango. They could also be 
the governments affiliated to these organisations considering that these governments provide 
sponsorship to these organisations. A third possibility lies in the need for states to maintain their 
reputation. 
The suggestion that external actors are the drivers of cooperation in the delta would be 
more on par with the current situation of many African governments that are tied to 
conditionalities that come with aid. Further investigation will be required to better understanding 
the situation. 
Botswana has effectively used regimes in order to enhance its position vis-a-vis other 
states access to the resources of the delta. Of importance for further research would be the extent 
to the which Botswana will go in playing this game. As has been emphatically put down by 
Namibia, water abstraction is not negotiable; strategies to ensure this happens will be incisive to 
policy makers, scholars and above all, the human security in the Okavango region. 
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Appendix A: The Permanent Okavango River Basin 
Commission (OKACOM) – A Review of the Agreement 
The OKACOM agreement is a relatively simple and non complicated document (Heyns, 
2007b:155). It has 8 sections – a preamble and seven articles (Treaty, 1994). The preamble 
recognises the importance of maintaining good neighbourliness and also the existing and 
emerging developmental programmes within the Okavango basin and their impact on the 
environment. It also accepts  
 
the concepts of environmentally sound natural resource management sustainable 
development and the equitable utilization of shared water course systems as reflected in 
relevant provision of agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development held at Rio de Janeiro in June 1992… [and]… the Helsinki Rules on the use of 
waters of International rivers as approved by the 52nd conference of the International Law 
Association (Treaty, 1994).  
 
Citing these two sources, means that the OKACOM accepts the principles implied under 
these provisions. The Helsinki Rules also cover the issue of fair and equitable utilisation of water 
resources. What does this exactly mean in the case of the Okavango?  
 
Article one of the OKACOM agreement deals with the establishment of a Permanent 
Okavango River Basin Commission to be maintained by the three states. The main objective of 
the commission is to act as a technical advisor to the three states on “matters relating to the 
conservation, development and utilisation of water resources of common interest…and shall 
perform such other functions pertaining to the development and utilisation of such resources” 
(Treaty, 1994). This article also puts upon the member states to the agreement the responsibility of 
informing other members of any planned development projects in the Okavango Basin (Treaty, 
1994). 
 
The second article of the agreement deals with the composition of the commission. The 
treaty provides for the commission to be made up of three delegations, one from each of the 
member countries, with each delegation having up to three members appointed by the member 
state. Considering that the commission will be dealing with issues of a multi-disciplinary nature, 
the head of delegation from each of the member states is allowed to appoint any person, as a co-
opted member, to advise the commissioners. The number of co-opted members that can attend a 
meeting at any one time is limited to three. This means that there are 9 core commissioners from 
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the three states. A meeting with a maximum number of co-opted advisors will have a total of 18 
people. 
 
The third article stipulates the procedure for meetings. The agreement stipulates that the 
commission will meet at least once in a year with more frequent meetings as the need arises. 
Article 3.5 details the decision making process as follows: 
 
All the decision of the commission shall be taken on the basis of consensus between the 
delegations, but in the event that the commission fails to reach consensus, the matter under 
discussion shall be referred to contracting parties by the respective delegations for further 
negotiations (Treaty, 1994). 
 
This article as it stands, and in the light of the objective of its establishment, gives all and 
takes all at the same time. The commission is supposed to be a technical advisor to the contracting 
parties as provided for in the first article. However if it cannot reach a consensus on a matter being 
discussed, the matter is referred to the contracting parties for further negotiation. Technical advice 
implies value free judgement based on scientific evidence available at that specific time, unless if 
the issue being discussed has nothing to do with technical advice, in which case this implies that 
the commission takes much more responsibility than simply advising the contracting parties. It 
also takes the front of a contracting party and negotiates interests on behalf of a contracting party. 
 
The fourth article deals with the advisory functions of the commission. The treaty lists 6 
functions which have been reproduced here (Treaty, 1994). It will advise on: 
a) Measures and arrangements to determine the long term safe yield of water available from 
all potential water resources in the Okavango River Basin; 
b) The reasonable demand of water from consumers in the Okavango River Basin; 
c) The criteria to be adopted in the conservation, equitable allocation and sustainable use of 
water resources in the Okavango River Basin; 
d) The investigations, separately or jointly by the contracting parties relating to the 
development of any water resources in the Okavango River Basin, including the 
construction, operation and maintenance of any water works in connection herewith; 
e) The prevention of pollution of water resources and the control of aquatic weeds in the 
Okavango River Basin; 
f) Measures that can be implemented by any one of the contracting parties to alleviate short 
term difficulties resulting from water shortages in the Okavango River Basin during 
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periods of drought taking into consideration the availability of stored water and the water 
requirements within the territories of the respective parties at that time. 
 
Article five relates to the powers granted to the commission. These are in relation to the 
carrying out of its advisory functions like the independent appointing of consultants to carry out 
work on behalf of the commissioners. Article six details the financial arrangements. Generally, the 
agreements provides for member states to meet costs associated with their commissioners carrying 
out duties for the commission. It also provides for the equitable sharing of other costs among the 
three states. Article seven contains the concluding articles. This article also provides for disputes 
arising to be settled by the member states. 
 
Considering the agreement in its entirety, one sees that it hinges heavily on the availability 
and dissemination of information. For instance, in order for the commission to act as credible 
advisors to their governments, they need to base their advice on well founded research. Research 
activities, especially environmental research can sometimes be expensive depending on the 
methodologies used. Other studies use satellite imagery as aids for generating information, or the 
use of proprietary software for data analysis and scenario building, all which come with huge 
price tags.9 This therefore means that the commission needs to be well resourced in order to 
competently advise the member states. A a result of the heavy financial requirements the 
commission may actually end up being dependent on the external funding and the motives of the 
sources of those funds. A second observation, un-related to the first is the ambiguity of terms 
which have not been defined. As an example, article 3.5 dealing with the functions of the 
commission, details that the commission will advise members states on “the reasonable demand of 
water from consumers in the Okavango River Basin” (Treaty, 1994). In this case, what are 
reasonable demands? 
                                                 
9 A study by Dominic Kniveton, Russell Layberry, Lotta Andersson
 
, Thomas Gumbricht, Denis Hughes, Susan 
Ringrose, Hubert Savenije, Martin Todd, Julie Wilk, Piotr Wolsk titled  “Satellite based rainfall data and flooding 
over the Okavango River Basin in Southern Africa.” is an example of such studies. 
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Appendix B: Time line of Major Water events in Southern 
Africa 
Year Event 
1926 South Africa and Portugal (Angola) agreed that South West Africa (Namibia) had the 
right to the lower half of the Cunene River. This was the First Water Use Agreement 
(Heyns, 2003:10) 
1964 Second Water Use Agreement between South Africa (South West Africa – Namibia) and 
the Portugal (Angola and Mozambique) on rivers of mutual interest which included in 
addition to the Cunene, the Cuvelai and the Kavango (Okavango) River and other rivers 
such as the Incomati and Maputo. (Heyns, 2003:10) 
1967 Kingdom of Swaziland acceded to the 1964 Agreement above (Heyns, 2003:10). 
1968 Agreement between South Africa and Portugal on the Cahora Bassa Project on the 
Zambezi River (Turton, 2005:6) 
1969 Third Water Use Agreement establishing the Permanent Joint Technical Commission 
between South West Africa (Namibia) and Angola (Heyns, 2003:10) 
1978 Lesotho and South Africa Establish a Join Technical Committee on the Limpopo River 
(Heyns, 2003:19) 
1980 Interim Government Instituted in Namibia (Heyns, 2003:20) 
1980 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference Launched in Lusaka 
Zambia (Turton, 2005:9) 
1980 Lagos Plan of Action to develop water resources agreed on by the African Ministers 
Council on Water (AMCOR) 
1983 Agreement between South Africa and Botswana on the shared Limpopo Basin 
establishing the Joint Permanent Technical Committee (Heyns 1995 and Pallet, 1997, 
cited in Els and Rowntree, n.d). 
1983 Tripartite Permanent Technical Commission established between Mozambique, South 
Africa and Swaziland in February  (Mohamed, 2003:222) 
1984 Water formally became a political agenda in the fourth SADCC Consultative Conference 
in Zambia due to water scarcity and drought experienced around the time (Turton, 
2005:9) 
1986 Treaty establishing the Joint Permanent Technical Commission between Lesotho and 
South Africa on the Limpopo river signed on 24th October (Heyns, 2003:19, Turton, 
2005:11). 
1986 Limpopo Basin Permanent Technical Commission (LBPTC) established by states of the 
Limpopo river namely Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Heyns 1995 and Pallet 
1997, cited in Els and Rowntree, n.d). Mohamed includes Botswana in this agreement 
(Mohamed, 2003:221). This commission did not take off (Mohamed, 2003:221). 
1987 Lesotho Highlands Water Project Started (Heyns, 2003:19) 
1987 South Africa and Interim Government of Namibia entered into agreement to cooperate on 
the waters of the Orange River (Heyns, 2003:20, Turton, 2005:11). 
1987 The ZACPLAN Agreement signed in Harare Zimbabwe in May of that year between 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Salewicz, 2003:117) 
1989 Agreement between South Africa and Botswana on the shared Limpopo basin evolved to 
a Joint Permanent Technical Commission (Heyns 1995 and Pallet, 1997 cited in Els and 
Rowntree, n.d). 
1990 Independent Namibia endorsed the previous agreements between South Africa and 
Portugal. The Permanent Joint Technical Commission was reinstated. (Heyns, 2003:11) 
1992 Permanent Water Commission established between Namibia and South Africa on the 
Orange River (Heyns, 2003:20). 
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1992 Treaty signed between South Africa and Namibia to establish a joint Irrigation Authority 
supplied from the Orange River (Heyns, 2003:22). 
1994 Tripartite agreement established the Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission 
(OKACOM). The agreement was between Angola, Botswana and Namibia. (Heyns, 
2003:18) 
1994 Namibia Proposed the establishment of a Joint Permanent Orange River Commission 
between basin states (Heyns, 2003:20). 
1994 SADC Water Sector Coordinating Unit created in Lesotho (Heyns, 2003:23) 
1995 SADC Water Protocol signed in Johannesburg at the SADC August Summit (Mohamed, 
2003:214) 
1995 Limpopo Basin Permanent Technical Commission (LBPTC) revived at discussions held 
in August in Pretoria (Mohamed, 2003:221) 
1996 Joint Water Commission signed in Maputo Mozambique between South Africa and 
Mozambique relating to common waters including the Limpopo 
1997 SADC Water Protocol amended to take into account the UN Convention on the Law of 
Non Navigational Uses of International Water Courses (Ramoeli, 2002 cited in Turton, 
2005:14) 
2001 The Orange-Senqu Comission (ORASECOM) was established by Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and South Africa at Okapuka in Namibia (Heyns, 2003:21). 
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Appendix C: International Water Cooperation Experience 
 
The Global Instruments 
On the global level, transboundary rivers fall within the 1997 UN Convention on the Law 
of Non Navigational Uses of International Water Courses (United Nations, 1997). The convention 
was put in place in the spirit of advancing international law as it would assist in promoting and 
implementing the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter as contained in article 1 
and 2. Article 1 of the United Nations charter stipulates that the United Nations is responsible for 
maintaining international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations, 
the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems and the 
harmonization of actions of nations. Article 2 of the United Nations charter contains the principles 
within which the above will be achieved, which are mainly based on sovereign equality of nations. 
The convention outlines six general principles on which the convention is based in 
addition to the principles of the United Nations charter, as follows: 
a) Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation 
b) Consideration of the geographic, hydrological, climatic and ecological conditions; social 
and economic needs, population dependent on the watercourse, the effects of the uses of 
the water course, existing and potential uses and availability of alternatives in order to 
determine equitable and reasonable utilization. 
c) Obligation not to cause significant harm 
d) General obligation to cooperate 
e) Regular exchange of data and information and 
f) The recognition of the relationship between different kinds of uses. 
The convention also covers other issues like the procedures for notification of water course 
states for planned measures by a watercourse state; and the protection, preservation and 
management of watercourses.  
In order for the convention to come into force, the final clauses of the convention, 
specifically article 36 (1), states that the convention will enter into force after 35 states ratify the 
treaty. WWF International reported that the convention was short of 18 parties for the convention 
to enter into force (WWF, 2009). 
International water cooperation also draws heavily from the Helsinki rules. These are a set 
of principles that act as guidelines that can help to reduce confrontation between states sharing 
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international rivers and enhance cooperation. Promulgated in 1966, the Helsinki rules promote 
fairness in the distribution of water by taking into account the economic and social situation in the 
basin states. The overriding principle of the rules is that states within the basin are entitled to a 
reasonable and equitable share of water from an international basin (Pallet, 1997:64).  
Another international instrument not directly concerned with international rivers, but 
which is very important in the Okavango as a wetland, is the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance. This convention provides the framework for international cooperation 
for the protection of wetlands. The United Nations, Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO), is the depository of the convention with the secretariat being 
administered by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the 
International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau (IWRB) (Swatuk, 2003:121). 
Water Cooperation: Continental Experience 
A 2003 World Bank study puts the number of international rivers in Africa at 55 (Sadoff et 
al., 2003: 4). This does not include the number of lakes that straddle international boundaries like 
Lake Malawi, Lake Victoria and others. According to the World Bank, every country in Africa 
has an international river within its territorial boundary (Sadoff et al., 2003: 8). As can be seen 
from this situation, continent wide, this becomes a mammoth task when it comes to coordinating 
the utilization and management of transboundary rivers considering that 41 countries have 2 or 
more transboundary rivers, while 15 countries have 5 or more (Sadoff et al., 2003:8). Africa is 
home to some of the most contested transboundary rivers. The Nile river is one example where 
Egypt and Sudan are basing their legal claims on the River Nile from a colonial agreement in 1959 
(Timmerman, 2005:6). However, the situation has changed, with more upstream riparian making 
claims to the same water. The population increase along the river is a further complication, 
growing at the rate of 2-3% per year (Timmerman, 2005: 6) in addition to poverty and ecosystem 
degradation (Tesfaye, 2005:1). There is however to the knowledge of the author, no continental 
wide convention or protocol on transboundary rivers. The only mention of water on a continental 
level is in connection with supply and sanitation in 2002 within the context of the Abuja 
Ministerial Conference on Water (Salman, 2002). 
Water Cooperation: The Southern Africa Experience 
Southern Africa is home to 15 international river basins (Turton 2002). Unlike the 
continental body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been actively 
engaged in the management of transboundary rivers coming up with a protocol in 1995 and 
impressively beating the United Nations by about 2 years. This came as a result of the recognition 
that there was so much interconnectedness among countries when it came to international rivers 
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with 70% of the regional surface water shared between two or more states. There was a further 
realization that drought was and still remains a real threat to the region in terms of the livelihoods 
of the majority of southern Africans.   
The SADC Water protocol contains the provisions for the establishment of the River Basin 
management institutions for shared watercourse system in article 3. This protocol requires that 
member states establish appropriate institutions in each basin, whose objectives are to: 
a) Develop a monitoring policy for the shared watercourse system 
b) Promote the equitable utilization of the shared watercourse system 
c) Formulate strategies for the development of the shared watercourse system 
d) Monitor the execution of the integrated water resource development plans in the shared 
watercourse system 
The functions of these institutions have been detailed in Article 5 some of which are: 
a) Monitoring compliance with water resource legislation and where necessary 
recommending amendments and/or the introduction of new legislation. 
b) Functions with regard to research, information and data handling 
c) Water control and utilization in the shared watercourse 
d) Environmental protection. 
The protocol, unlike the UN Convention, came into force on the 29th September 1998. It 
was revised in 2000 with the amended protocol coming into force in September 2003 (Ramoeli, 
2007). According to Ramoeli (2007), the following is the progress in terms of the establishment of 
the International River Basin Organisations in the region. 
 
Name of River 
Basin 
Progress / Name of 
Institution 
States party10 
Zambezi ZAMCOM (2004) Angola, Namibia, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania 
Orange Senqu ORASECOM (2000) Namibia, Botswana, South 
Africa and Lesotho 
Limpopo LIMCOM (2003) Botswana, South Africa, 
                                                 
10 Part of the data fro the States Party taken from Turton (2003). 
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Zimbabwe and Mozambique 
Okavango OKACOM (1995) Angola, Namibia and 
Botswana 
Pungwe Work ongoing Mozambique and Zimbabwe11 
Inco - Maputo Water Sharing Agreement 
(2002) 
Mozambique, South Africa 
and Swaziland 
Congo River TBD Angola, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Zambia 
Umbeluzi Work Ongoing Mozambique and Swaziland 
Cunene / Cuvelai Work Ongoing Angola and Namibia 
Rovuma 2006 Malawi, Mozambique and 
Tanzania 
Additionally, the Southern Africa Development Community has a 25 year vision for water 
which guides water policy in the region and a Regional Strategic Action Plan (Ramoeli, 2007). 
The regional strategic action plan has four clusters as follows: 
a) Water Governance 
b) Regional Water resource planning and management  
c) Infrastructure Development Support 
d) Capacity building support for integrated water resource management (IWRM) 
The Okavango River Basin Commission was one of the first river basin organizations to be 
established and in many ways a precursor to the practice in the region. 
                                                 
11 Data from this row to the end of the column on states sharing the rivers from Heyns (2003) “Water Resources 
Management in Southern Africa” in Nakayama (ed) International Waters in Southern Africa UNU Press. Tokyo. 
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